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“Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has 
come.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Due Process Clause2 has recently undergone 
something of a renaissance as a limitation to be applied to the 
state tax jurisdiction rules pertaining to multistate businesses. 
The 1992 U.S. Supreme Court case, Quill v. North Dakota,3 
suggested that the Due Process Clause was to play second 
fiddle to the Commerce Clause4 in such tax matters, and would 
not typically be relevant given the more likely, more rigorous 
application of the latter clause.5  But Quill also suggested that 
 
 1. VICTOR HUGO, HISTORY OF A CRIME. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law.”) 
 3. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 4. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have the power “to regulate 
commerce . . . among the several states”). 
 5. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.7 (“[Our prior] comments might suggest that 
every tax that passes contemporary Commerce Clause analysis is also valid under 
the Due Process Clause, [but] it does not follow that the converse is as well true: 
A tax may be consistent with due process and yet unduly burden interstate 
commerce.”).  The analysis in Quill was with respect to the “dormant Commerce 
Clause.”  Id. at 309 (“Article I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution expressly authorizes 
Congress to ‘regulate Commerce’ with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States.  It says nothing about the protection of interstate commerce in the absence 
of any action by Congress. Nevertheless . . . the Commerce Clause is more than 
an affirmative grant of power; it has a negative sweep as well.  The Clause . . . by 
its own force prohibits certain state actions that interfere with interstate 
commerce.”) (quotations omitted).  See United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer 
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its logic was the product of a bygone era,6 a point that is more 
apparent nearly twenty-five years later.7  In addition, the 
relevance of the Quill holding—pertaining to state tax 
jurisdiction or “nexus”—has diminished through changes in 
commercial practices and later judicial developments, further 
undercutting Quill’s statement as to the relationship between 
the two constitutional clauses.8  As a result, the Due Process 
Clause has increased in importance relative to the Commerce 
Clause in the context of state taxes—particularly corporate 
income and sales tax—as applied to multistate businesses.9 
Recent state tax cases10 and commentaries,11 as well as 
developments with respect to Congressional legislation 
directed at state taxation,12 have cast light on the renewed 
 
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007) (“[Although the Commerce 
Clause] does not in terms limit the power of States to regulate commerce, we have 
long interpreted the Commerce Clause as an implicit restraint on state authority, 
even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute”—the “so-called ‘dormant’ 
aspect of the Commerce Clause.”).  All references in this Article to the Commerce 
Clause are to the dormant Commerce Clause unless otherwise specified. 
 6. See infra notes 91–98 and accompanying text. 
 7. See Michael T. Fatale, Common Sense: Implicit Constitutional 
Limitations on Congressional Preemptions of State Tax, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
41, 85–89 (2012).  See generally infra notes 28 and 116–47 and accompanying 
text. 
 8. See infra notes 99–147 and accompanying text. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See, e.g., Gore Enterprise Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller, 87 A.3d 1263 (Md. 
2014) (affirming a state tax, in part by rejecting a due process challenge); Scioto 
Ins. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 279 P.3d 782 (Okla. 2012) (striking down a 
state tax on due process grounds); Griffith v. ConAgra Brands, Inc., 728 S.E.2d 
74 (W.Va. 2012) (striking down a state tax in part on due process grounds).  See 
also In re Washington Mutual, Inc., 485 B.R. 510 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (federal 
bankruptcy court finds state lacks tax jurisdiction over a corporation under the 
Due Process Clause for purposes of pursuing a corporate income tax claim). 
 11. See, e.g., Paul H. Frankel, Craig B. Fields, & Richard C. Call, The Due 
Process Clause as a Bar to State Tax Nexus, STATE TAX TODAY, (Oct. 29, 2012); 
Mary Benton, Clark Calhoun & Elizabeth Cha, Due Process and Commerce 
Clause Tests Are Never, Ever Getting Back Together, STATE TAX TODAY, (Jul. 22, 
2013); Brian J. Kirkell, Craig Ridenour & Charles Britt, Sales Factor Presence 
After McIntyre Machinery, STATE TAX  TODAY, (Feb. 11, 2013); David Sawyer, 
Practitioners Anticipate a Resurgence of Due Process Nexus Litigation, STATE TAX 
TODAY, (Nov. 1, 2013); Brannon P. Denning, Due Process and Personal 
Jurisdiction, Implications for State Taxes, STATE TAX TODAY, (Jun. 18, 2012). 
 12.  See Red Earth v. United States, 657 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2011), vacated, 
2013 Dist. LEXIS 188691 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (concluding the states may lack the 
capacity to impose tax jurisdiction under a recently-enacted federal statute, The 
Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (“PACT”) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 375 et seq., given the 
provisions of the Due Process Clause); Gordon v. Holder, 721 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (same); State’s Attorneys General: Marketplace Fairness Act Would Violate 
Due Process Clause, STATE TAX TODAY, (June 18, 2013) (questioning the states’ 
568  SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:55 
importance of the Due Process Clause.  The commentary has 
cited recent Supreme Court cases pertaining to the application 
of the Due Process Clause in matters of adjudicative 
jurisdiction,13 because the analysis applied for purposes of 
adjudicative and state tax jurisdiction is “comparable.”14  In 
particular, the Supreme Court’s decision in J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,15 which pertains to “specific” as 
opposed to “general” adjudicative jurisdiction,16 is potentially 
relevant to the state tax inquiry because state tax cases involve 
questions of specific jurisdiction.17 
McIntyre was a plurality decision that rendered three 
inconsistent opinions that failed to command a majority of the 
Court.18  As McIntyre was the first specific jurisdiction case 
decided by the Court in twenty-four years, it was certain to 
generate a great deal of scholarly attention in the important 
area of adjudicative jurisdiction—a result enhanced by the 
Court’s somewhat unclear precedential analysis.19  The facts in 
McIntyre do not resemble those in a typical fact pattern in 
which state tax jurisdiction is at issue.20  In part for this 
reason, the case may be of less relevance in the state tax area.21  
However,  given the increased importance of the due process 
 
ability to impose tax jurisdiction under a proposed federal statute, the 
Marketplace Fairness Act (“MFA”), S. 336/S. 743/H.R. 684 113th Cong. (2013), 
given the potential application of the Due Process Clause).  The PACT Act and 
the MFA are discussed in greater detail infra notes 420-459 and accompanying 
text. 
 13.  See generally the articles noted supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
The recent U.S. Supreme Court cases are Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 14.  See Quill, 504 U.S. at 306–08 (evaluating the Court’s adjudicative 
jurisdiction cases and stating that “[c]omparable reasoning” applies to determine 
state tax jurisdiction). 
 15. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 16. “Specific jurisdiction” refers to adjudicative jurisdiction where the lawsuit 
“arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum,” whereas 
“general jurisdiction” obtains where a defendant’s “continuous corporate 
operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify 
suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from 
those activities.”  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014). 
 17. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  See infra notes 211–12 and 
accompanying text. 
 18. See generally infra notes 255–313 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 259–61, 314 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 333–38 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra notes 324–48 and accompanying text. 
2015] DUE PROCESS & TAX JURISDICTION 569 
analysis in state tax cases, state tax practitioners must 
carefully grapple with the multi-part McIntyre decision. 
The enhanced emphasis on the due process analysis in 
state tax jurisdiction cases has been a generally favorable 
development for state governments seeking to impose their 
taxes.  The historic Commerce Clause analysis that the 
Supreme Court applied to state tax jurisdiction cases often 
relied upon arbitrary limitations that fostered aggressive tax 
planning and resulted in decisions that were economically 
questionable.22  In contrast, greater reliance upon notions of 
due process fairness has resulted in decisions that more closely 
consider whether the taxpayer is being asked to pay its “just 
share of the state tax burden.”23 
Although the trend emphasizing due process principles in 
state tax jurisdiction cases has generally improved state tax 
administration, recent cases and other legal developments 
suggest several specific areas where the  analysis remains 
uncertain and potentially problematic.24  In the corporate 
income tax area, the states have wrestled for more than twenty 
years with cases in which companies have sought to avoid 
taxation through structural and transactional planning with 
respect to company-owned intangible property, such as 
trademarks.25  The states have had significant success in these 
cases, generally by arguing that the “physical presence” nexus 
standard posited by Quill does not apply to the states’ 
corporate income tax—meaning that the relevant test largely 
tracks the due process standard that determines adjudicative 
jurisdiction.26  However, more recent state cases suggest a 
variation on this same tax planning that may further test the 
reach of the states’ jurisdictional rules.27 
In the sales tax area, the major state tax issue continues 
to be taxation of companies that exploit the state’s economic 
market by making tax-free Internet sales in reliance upon the 
Quill physical presence jurisdictional standard.28  States have 
 
 22. See infra notes 56–76 and accompanying text. 
 23.  Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623–24 (1981).  See 
generally infra notes 99–147 and accompanying text. 
 24. See generally infra Part III. 
 25. See infra notes 106–10 and 371–78 and accompanying text. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See infra notes 380–99 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 414–19 and accompanying text.  A study by economists at 
the University of Tennessee concluded that the states would collectively lose 
$10.1 to $11.3 billion in sales tax for the 2012 tax year because of the rule in Quill.  
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successfully applied due process-like fairness principles to 
narrow the application of the Quill physical presence standard 
to cases where the taxpayer’s reliance upon Quill is 
reasonable.29  But certain fact patterns continue to test the 
state tax nexus rules, such as an Internet vendor using 
affiliates or other in-state representatives to perform activities 
other than making actual Internet sales.30  Also, more 
generally, twenty-three years after Quill suggested that 
Congress could resolve the states’ sales tax jurisdictional 
dilemma by legislating as to the appropriate standard, 
Congress may finally be close to doing just that.31  But some 
commentators have questioned whether the Due Process 
Clause could limit the effectiveness of such a Congressional 
act.32 
Accordingly, this Article proceeds in four sections.  The 
first section traces the historical developments that have led to 
the re-emergence of due process principles as the primary 
limitation on the assertion of state tax jurisdiction.33  This 
section notes that the Commerce Clause was originally 
intended to permit Congress to address situations where the 
states were, through their tax or regulatory powers, engaged 
in some form of economic discrimination favoring in-state 
commercial actors relative to commercial actors located outside 
the state.34  A similar power of judicial oversight, applicable 
even in the absence of Congressional legislation, was later 
recognized by the Supreme Court—the application of the so-
called dormant Commerce Clause.35  Subsequent Supreme 
Court cases broadened the focus of the Commerce Clause, 
permitting the courts to go beyond the original intention of the 
Commerce Clause and to generally engage in state tax cases in 
subjective determinations as to whether the state tax somehow 
inhibited free trade.36  However, more recent Supreme Court 
cases have generally re-posited the Commerce Clause as being 
an inquiry that is primarily focused on the question of 
 
See Donald Bruce, William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, State and Local Sales Tax 
Revenue Losses from E-Commerce, 52 ST. TAX NOTES 537 (2009). 
 29. See generally infra notes 116–47 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra notes 414–19 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra notes 424–26 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra notes 442–44 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra Part I. 
 34. See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 35. See supra note 5 and infra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 36. See generally infra notes 56–76 and accompanying text. 
2015] DUE PROCESS & TAX JURISDICTION 571 
discrimination.37 
The first section notes the application of a second 
constitutional inquiry, the Due Process Clause, which has 
probed the states’ tax jurisdictional reach since the enactment 
of the 14th Amendment.38 This section demonstrates that as 
the Commerce Clause inquiry has receded back to its intended 
role of policing state tax discrimination—something that is not 
usually an issue in state tax jurisdiction cases39—courts have 
primarily focused on the application of due process principles.40 
The second section evaluates the due process standards to 
be applied in-state tax jurisdiction cases.41  This section 
considers the historic approach the Supreme Court has applied 
and considers the Court’s recent adjudicative jurisdiction 
cases, which apply by analogy in the state tax context.42  This 
section provides a detailed analysis of the Court’s recent 
specific jurisdiction case, McIntyre,43 which some persons have 
claimed may impose additional limits upon the states in tax 
jurisdiction cases.44  This section concludes that the Court’s 
recent adjudicative jurisdiction cases, including McIntrye, 
should not impact the due process standards to be applied in 
state tax cases.45 
The third section evaluates several recent state corporate 
income tax and sales tax cases that have considered due 
process jurisdiction questions,46 in particular two recent state 
supreme court cases that have applied the Due Process Clause 
to impose limits upon a state’s assertion of corporate income 
tax nexus.47  This section also examines  due process questions 
recently raised by federal cases and commentary pertaining to 
Congressional legislation that has either been enacted or 
 
 37. See infra notes 149–59 and accompanying text. 
 38. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.  See also infra notes 164–67 and 
accompanying text. 
 39. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 40. See generally infra notes 77–147 and accompanying text. 
 41. See generally infra Part II. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See infra notes 262–368 and accompanying text. 
 44. See generally the articles cited supra note 11.  See also infra note 341 and 
accompanying text. 
 45. See generally Part II. 
 46. See infra notes 371–419 and accompanying text. 
 47. See infra notes 379–99 and accompanying text.  The cases are Scioto Ins. 
Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 279 P.3d 782 (Okla. 2012) and Griffith v. ConAgra 
Brands, Inc., 728 S.E.2d 74 (W.Va. 2012). 
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proposed with respect to state tax jurisdiction.48   
The final section offers some concluding remarks.49  This 
section concludes that the trend favoring the Due Process 
Clause over the Commerce Clause as the primary principle 
evaluating state tax jurisdiction applied to a multistate 
business is a positive one for state taxing agencies and for state 
tax administration in general. 
I. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND DUE PROCESS 
LIMITATIONS UPON THE IMPOSITION OF A STATE TAX 
A. The Early History: Defining “Interstate Commerce” and 
Policing State Tax Burdens 
The Commerce Clause is set forth at Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution.  It states, as relevant to this 
Article, that Congress shall have the power “to regulate 
commerce . . . among the several states.”50  It is an affirmative 
grant of legislative power but has been held to have a dormant 
aspect that allows it to be applied as a judicial limitation on 
the states’ taxing or regulatory powers in court cases even in 
the absence of Congressional action.51 
The application of the Commerce Clause as a limitation on 
the taxing powers of the states has proven difficult for the 
Supreme Court, which has utilized various interpretative 
approaches through the years.  The Commerce Clause was 
intended to address state attempts at economic protectionism, 
i.e., state attempts to favor in-state economic actors vis-à-vis 
out-of-state economic actors.52  This form of economic 
protectionism was common under the country’s original 
governing document, the Articles of Confederation, and was 
seen as so deleterious that it was one of the driving forces 
 
 48. See infra notes 420–59 and accompanying text. 
 49. See infra notes 460–72 and accompanying text. 
 50. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 51. See supra note 5. 
 52. Donald H. Regan, Reflections on United States v. Lopez: How to Think 
About the Federal Power and Incidentally to Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 554, 577 n.95 (1995) (“We know . . . that the main reason for giving 
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce was to allow Congress to 
oversee state protectionist measures.”); Jesse H. Choper and Tung Yin, State 
Taxation and the Dormant Commerce Clause: the Object Measure Approach, 1998 
SUP. CT. REV. 193, 199–200 (1998) (noting the “Dormant Commerce Clause’s core 
prohibition of discrimination against interstate commerce.”).  See generally 
Fatale, supra note 7, at 52–55. 
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resulting in the ratification of the U.S. Constitution.53  The role 
of the Commerce Clause is not limited to state taxation—the 
Clause addresses such discriminatory action whether affected 
by a state through the means of its tax law or through 
regulatory action.54  But importantly, the national government 
was formed by state governments, and state sovereignty, 
including the fundamental right of taxation, was specifically 
intended to be retained under the U.S. Constitution.55 
To address states’ attempts at economic discrimination, 
the Court, for much of its history, has attempted to distinguish 
interstate from intrastate commerce and to restrict state 
action with respect to the former, but not the latter.56  At times, 
these restrictions consisted of outright prohibitions upon the 
states’ capacity to either tax or regulate interstate commerce.57  
These restrictions also sometimes consisted of attempts to 
prohibit “direct” burdens as imposed upon interstate 
commerce, as opposed to intrastate commerce.58 
 
 53. See Paul J. Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: An 
Appraisal and Suggested Approach, 3 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 234, 234 (1953) (“The 
need for national economic unity unaffected by state borders and untrammeled 
by discriminatory and retaliatory state action against commerce from sister 
states was one of the chief reasons for abandonment of the Articles of 
Confederation and the adoption of our Federal Constitution, by which Congress 
was entrusted with the power to regulate interstate commerce.”); Fatale, supra 
note 7, at 52–55. 
 54. See also Quill, 504 U.S. at 312 (stating that under the dormant Commerce 
Clause, “we have ruled that that Clause prohibits discrimination against 
interstate commerce . . . and bars state regulations that unduly burden interstate 
commerce.”) (emphasis added) (cites omitted).  See Fatale, supra note 7, at 60. 
 55. See Fatale, supra note 7, at 42–44, 53. 
 56. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1995) 
(discussing the analysis used by the Court and stating, inter alia, “[f]or nearly a 
century [after Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, (1824)], the Court’s 
Commerce Clause decisions dealt but rarely with the extent of Congress’ power, 
and almost entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on state legislation that 
discriminated against interstate commerce.”). 
 57. Hartman, supra note 53, at 234 (“In its zeal to preserve an unfettered flow 
of interstate commerce, during most of our constitutional history, including the 
present, the predominant doctrinal declaration of the Court has been an 
adherence to the philosophy that interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all by 
the states.”).  See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309 (“Our early cases, beginning with Brown 
v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (1827), swept broadly, and in Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 
127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888), we declared that ‘no State has the right to lay a tax on 
interstate commerce in any form.’ ” ) 
 58.  See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309–10 (noting the use of the “direct”-”indirect” 
test from late in the 1800’s until 1946); Northwestern States Portland Cement 
Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959) (“It has long been established doctrine 
that the Commerce Clause gives exclusive power to the Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce, and its failure to act on the subject in the area of taxation 
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A significant problem with the Court’s early approach to 
the Commerce Clause, which became exacerbated by 
technological developments during the twentieth century, is 
that it is not easy to delineate interstate from intrastate 
commerce.59  In its early cases, the Court equated intrastate 
commerce with in-state “production, manufacturing, and 
mining,” which tended to be localized,60 and considered the 
economic activities of persons crossing state lines, most 
significantly sales persons, to represent interstate commerce.61  
This approach became increasingly difficult to implement 
during the early to mid-1900’s as more and more businesses 
became transient in their operations.62 
 
nevertheless requires that interstate commerce shall be free from any direct 
restrictions or impositions by the States.”).  See also Hartman, supra note 53, at 
237 (noting early 20th century cases where “[t]he exactions were upheld on the 
ground that they were levied on a ‘local incident’ or ‘local activity,’ or that the 
burden of the tax on the commerce was ‘indirect’ or ‘incidental’ ” ). 
 59.  See Hartman, supra note 53, at 236–37, 237 n.12 (noting cases where the 
states were allowed to “pass statutes to safeguard their people from injurious 
local effects that may attend interstate traffic, which nevertheless in some 
measure affect interstate commerce”). See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554 (noting the 
Court’s early Commerce Clause cases where there were “difficult determinations” 
because “the interstate and intrastate aspects of commerce were so mingled 
together”). 
 60.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554 (noting a long line of precedent beginning in 
the 1800’s and proceeding into the 1900’s where “the Court held that [the 
regulation of] certain categories of activity such as ‘production,’ ‘manufacturing,’ 
and ‘mining’ were within the province of state governments . . . under the 
Commerce Clause.”); Hartman, supra note 53, at 244 (citing early 20th century 
cases where the Court permitted “local governments to single out various ‘local’ 
events closely related to interstate commerce as the incidence of valid taxes . . . 
such as [the] installation [and] maintenance of pipelines in the ground”). 
 61.  Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 
458 (1959) (noting that under the Court’s longstanding doctrine to prohibit 
“direct” state burdens as imposed upon interstate commerce, a State could not 
“impose taxes upon persons passing through the state, or coming into it merely 
for a temporary purpose such as itinerant drummers”); Christopher D. Cameron 
& Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome 
Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 816 (1995) 
(noting that in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), where 
the company purposefully limited its state contacts to in-state sales persons, the 
company argued as did most business litigants of the era that the “state had no 
power to tax interstate commerce.”). 
 62. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753–54 (2014) (noting that in 
the context of adjudicative jurisdiction the “territorial” presence requirement 
adopted by the 1878 case, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) was eventually 
abandoned in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), 
“spurred by changes in the technology of transportation and communication, and 
the tremendous growth of interstate business activity.”) (quotes omitted); 
Cameron and Johnson, supra note 61, at 800–03 (discussing select Supreme 
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The Court’s attempt to forbid the states from imposing 
taxes with respect to interstate commerce eventually raised 
the prospect that the states would be foreclosed from taxing 
most forms of commerce, as over time most forms of commerce 
included an interstate aspect.63  Problematically, this 
consequence is potentially inconsistent with the Court’s 
historic understanding that under the Constitution interstate 
commerce can be made to pay its fair share of the states’ taxing 
burden.64  Also, over time the judicial determinations as to 
whether a certain type of commercial activity constituted 
interstate commerce became progressively more arbitrary.65 
In 1959, after several cases that trended in this direction,66 
the Court declared in Northwestern States Portland Cement 
Co. v. Minnesota67 that the states could impose income tax on 
businesses that merely sent their sales personnel across state 
lines.68  Implicitly, this determination dispensed with the 
 
Court due process cases in the years leading up to International Shoe). 
 63. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 53, at 252 (noting that, though the Court’s 
view allowed for the taxation of “an event which is not part of interstate 
commerce . . . [f]actually, of course, it is most difficult, if not impossible to find 
such an event in modern multi-state business”). 
 64. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 n.15 (1977) 
(stating that administrative inconvenience is not a basis for relieving multistate 
taxpayers from their share of the states’ tax burden and that therefore “interstate 
commerce may be made to pay its way”).  See also Barclay’s Bank PLC v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 310 (1994) (“The [Commerce] Clause does not 
shield interstate (or foreign) commerce from its fair share of the tax burden”) 
(quoting Department of Revenue v. Assoc. of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 
U.S. 734, 750 (1978); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 n.5 (1992) 
(“It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in 
interstate commerce from their just share of [the] state tax burden even though 
it increases the cost of doing business”) (quoting Commonwealth Edison v. 
Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623–24 (1981)).  Commonwealth Edison, quoted in Quill, 
in turn quoted from Western Livestock et al. v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 
254 (1938).  See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 623–24.  See also 
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 462 (1959) 
(“It is axiomatic that the founders did not intend to immunize [interstate] 
commerce from carrying its fair share of the costs of that state government in 
return for the benefits it derives from within the state.”). 
 65. See Hartman, supra note 53, at 244 (noting in a 1953 article that the 
judicial determinations “for determining what events can be segregated [as local] 
so as to serve as the fulcrum of the tax . . . [o]ftimes seem arbitrary.”) 
 66. See Portland Cement, 358 U.S. at 459-461 (citing cases). 
 67. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). 
 68. 358 U.S. at 452.  Portland Cement led to an Act of Congress, Public Law 
86-272, that preempted the state imposition of a corporate net income tax on facts 
similar to those in the case.  For a detailed discussion of that development and 
its history, see Michael T. Fatale, Federalism and State Business Activity Tax 
Nexus: Revisiting Public Law 86-272, 21 VA. TAX REV. 435, 474–79 (2002). 
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Court’s pre-existing distinction between intrastate and 
interstate commerce.69  Further, in 1961, the Court doubled 
down on the result in Portland Cement and held in Scripto, Inc. 
v. Carson70 that a state could impose a use tax collection 
obligation on a business whose only in-state contact was the 
activity of sales representatives.71  Scripto included the 
important conclusion that it did not matter whether the in-
state sales representatives of the business were legally 
employees of the business.72  As to this latter point, the Court 
sought to make clear that the terminology used by a business 
as a matter of contract was not relevant to the analysis of the 
business’ economic activity for state tax jurisdiction 
purposes.73 
The question of whether a burden directly or indirectly 
impacts interstate commerce raised similar interpretative 
difficulties.  The application of this rule in state tax cases often 
came to turn upon the phrasing of the state’s taxing statute.74  
For example, under the direct-indirect principle, a state tax 
would be struck down as unconstitutional under the Commerce 
Clause if it was imposed on the privilege of engaging in 
business in the state since such a tax was deemed to be a direct 
tax on interstate commerce.75  Therefore this rule became more 
 
 69. See 358 U.S. at 452 (“We conclude that net income from the interstate 
operations of a foreign corporation [i.e., generally sales solicitation and related 
activities] may be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not 
discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the taxing 
State forming sufficient nexus to support the same.”).  The Portland Cement 
holding was predicated on both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process 
Clause.  See id. 
 70. 362 U.S. 207 (1960). 
 71. Id. at 210–13. 
 72. Id. at 211 (“True, the ‘salesmen’ are not regular employees of appellant 
devoting full time to its service, but we conclude that such a fine distinction is 
without constitutional significance.”) 
 73.  Id. (“The formal shift in the contractual tagging of the salesman as 
‘independent’ neither results in changing his local function of solicitation nor 
bears upon its effectiveness in securing a substantial flow of goods into Florida . . . 
To permit such formal “ ‘ contractual shifts’ to make a constitutional difference 
would open the gates to a stampede of tax avoidance.”)  As in the case of Portland 
Cement, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), see supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text, 
Scripto was decided on both Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause grounds. 
See infra notes 214–19 and accompanying text (discussing Scripto in the context 
of the Court’s adjudicative jurisdiction cases). 
 74.  See Quill, 298 U.S. at 310 (noting that the rule was one that attached 
“constitutional significance to a semantic difference” in statutory wording). 
 75.  See id. (noting that in Complete Auto, “[w]e expressly overruled . . . 
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1951), which held that a 
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formal than pragmatic in its application.  Recognizing this, the 
Court disposed of the so-called “formal rule” in the 1977 case 
of Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.76 
B. The Supreme Court’s Current Dormant Commerce 
Clause Approach Focusing on Discrimination and Due 
Process 
Complete Auto became the bridge to the Court’s 
contemporary Commerce Clause approach.  Complete Auto 
replaced the Court’s prior direct-indirect burden inquiry with 
a four prong test that evaluates the legitimacy of a state tax.77  
One of those four prongs is an evaluation whether the state tax 
is discriminatory78—the inquiry that directly probes the 
rationale embodied in the Commerce Clause.79  The other three 
prongs—the “substantial nexus” prong that evaluates state tax 
jurisdiction and the two prongs that evaluate questions of 
whether the tax is fairly apportioned and fairly related to 
services provided by the state80—do not directly probe the 
discrimination question.81  Therefore, these latter three 
inquiries are more suspect as Commerce Clause principles.82  
 
tax on ‘the privilege of doing interstate business’ was unconstitutional, while 
recognizing that a differently denominated tax with the same economic effect 
would not be unconstitutional. Spector, as we [have] observed . . . created a 
situation in which magic words or labels could disable an otherwise constitutional 
levy.”) (cites omitted). 
 76. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).  See Quill, 504 U.S. at 309–10 (“Most recently, in 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 285, we renounced [our prior] . . . 
approach as attaching constitutional significance to a semantic difference . . . 
Complete Auto emphasized the importance of looking past “the formal language 
of the tax statute [to] its practical effect”) (brackets added) (quoting Complete 
Auto, 430 U. S. at 279).  See also Fatale, supra note 7, at 59–60, 60 n.96 
(discussing the demise of the “Formal Rule” in Complete Auto). 
 77. See generally 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 78. 430 U.S. at 279. 
 79. See Fatale supra note 7, at 60–61. 
 80. 430 U.S. at 279, 288. 
 81. See Choper & Yin, supra note 52, at 199 (“The central problem of Complete 
Auto is that its four prongs are functionally overlapping and redundant in 
attempting to fulfill the bedrock constitutional value serviced by judicial review 
of state taxation of interstate commerce: nondiscrimination against interstate 
commerce.”).  See also Bradley W. Joondeph, Rethinking the Role of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause in State Tax Jurisdiction, 24 VA. TAX REV. 109, 114 (2004) 
(“[T]he case for interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause to impose a nexus 
requirement with respect to state taxes is an uneasy one . . . [it] is unclear 
whether the Commerce Clause itself says anything about these jurisdictional 
requirements.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 
564, 618 (1997) (Scalia, J., Thomas, J. and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[O]ur 
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Later Supreme Court cases have made clear that the three 
non-discrimination prongs of Complete Auto generally embody 
due process principles.83 
 
negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence has taken us well beyond the 
invalidation of obviously discriminatory taxes on interstate commerce.  We have 
used the Clause to make policy-laden judgments that we are ill equipped and 
arguably unauthorized to make.”); id. at 618–19 (Scalia, J., Thomas, J. and 
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Complete Auto as an example of the Court’s 
foray “beyond the invalidation of obviously discriminatory taxes” to “policy-laden 
judgments” through the means of “multi factor tests in order to assess the 
perceived ‘effect’ any particular state tax or regulation has on interstate 
commerce.”). 
     The critiques of the dormant Commerce Clause in recent Supreme Court 
dissents—largely those of Justices Scalia and Thomas, see, e.g., id.—have been 
tacitly reflected, in part, in the Court’s majority decisions.  A recent example is 
the 2015 case, Comptroller v. Wynne, which applied the dormant Commerce 
Clause to strike down an aspect of Maryland’s personal income tax on 
discrimination grounds.  135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). In Wynne, a 5-4 decision, the 
majority specifically defended the dormant Commerce Clause against a challenge 
by dissenting Justices Thomas and Scalia that the doctrine is not rooted in the 
Constitution.  Id. at 1806-07.  But the majority’s defense referenced only the fact 
that the dormant Commerce Clause serves to address state tax discrimination, 
and, for example, made no mention of Complete Auto’s substantial nexus prong.  
Id.  The Wynne opinion does more generally reference the four prongs of Complete 
Auto, but notably—particularly given the fact the majority did specifically 
endeavor to defend the dormant Commerce Clause—only to observe that the 
lower Maryland court had “evaluated the tax under the four-part test” of that 
case.  Id. at 1793.  Although the lower Maryland court also struck down the tax 
in part on fair apportionment grounds, id., the Supreme Court makes no mention 
of “fair apportionment” in its analysis.  See generally Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787.  See 
also infra note 156. 
 83.  See, e.g., Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 373 
(1991) (“The Complete Auto test[s], while responsive to Commerce Clause 
dictates, encompas[s] as well the due process requirement that there be a 
‘minimal connection’ between the interstate activities and the taxing State, and 
a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the 
intrastate values of the enterprise.”); Amerada Hess Corp v. Director, 490 U.S. 
66, 79–80 (1989) (noting that the “appellants recognize that the Complete Auto 
test encompasses due process standards”).  See also infra note 103-105 and 
accompanying text (referencing language in MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Dep’t 
of Revenue, 128 S.Ct. 1501 2008)); Joondeph, supra note 81, at 132 (stating that 
the nexus requirement that the Court has posited under the dormant Commerce 
Clause in fact has its basis elsewhere in the Constitution “perhaps [as] an 
essential premise of our federal system [or perhaps as a requirement of] the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; or perhaps both” . . . and that 
“attributing this nexus requirement to the dormant Commerce Clause seems both 
unnecessary and misconceived.”); Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce 
Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and State Taxation: An Analysis in 
Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 Wayne L. Rev. 885, 919 (1985) (the “only 
element of [the Complete Auto] approach that properly finds itself its source in 
the negative Commerce Clause . . . is the nondiscrimination element, the other 
three elements involve due process considerations.”); John A. Swain, State Income 
Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45 Wm. & Mary L. 
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1. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota84 and the Application of 
Due Process Principles in Later State Corporate 
Income Tax and Sales Tax Cases 
The development of the Due Process Clause as a 
jurisdictional standard in state tax cases relative to the 
application of the Commerce Clause was put to the test in the 
1992 case, Quill v. North Dakota.85  Quill fostered the 
application of due process principles in the context of the 
states’ corporate income taxes, while stunting the use of those 
principles in the context of the states’ sales and use taxes.86  
However, even in the context of the states’ sales and use taxes, 
Quill left an important role for due process principles to play.87 
Some historical background helps to understand the due 
process jurisprudential impact of Quill.  As commercial 
technology continued to advance in the later part of the 
twentieth century, a significant question emerged as to 
whether a business could become subject to tax through its in-
state sales or income-producing activity where the contacts of 
the out-of-state business did not require in-state facilities or 
sales representatives.  An example of this question was 
resolved in the 1967 case Bellas Hess v. Illinois Department of 
Revenue,88 where the Court concluded that a mail order 
business could not be subject to a state’s use tax collection duty 
based merely upon the business’s in-state contacts of mail and 
common carrier (i.e., that some in-state property interest or 
representational activity was necessary).89  The Court justified 
its rule in Bellas Hess on both Commerce Clause and Due 
Process Clause grounds.90 
In Quill,91 the Court revisited its prior decision in Bellas 
Hess in part because of questions whether the case had become 
economically outdated or continued to reflect the Court’s then-
 
Rev. 319, 328, 328 n.34 (2003) (noting that in the Court’s prior cases leading up 
to Complete Auto “the nexus, fair apportionment, and fairly related prongs of the 
[Complete Auto] test were often rooted in due process rather than dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis.”). 
 84. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See infra notes 99–147 and accompanying text. 
 87. See infra notes 116–47 and accompanying text. 
 88. 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
 89. Id. at 758. 
 90. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305. 
 91. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
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current state tax constitutional doctrine.92  The Court 
suggested that, given the advances in its jurisprudential logic, 
it would not have reached the conclusion in Bellas Hess if the 
question in that case was a matter of first impression.93  But 
the Court retained the holding in Bellas Hess on the basis of 
stare decisis, particularly because it presumed that later 
growth in the mail order industry may have been due in part 
to the holding in that earlier case.94  Also, the Court feared that 
revocation of the rule from Bellas Hess would result in the 
practical consequence that mail order companies would be 
made to pay a large amount of retroactive tax.95 
The Court in Quill suggested that, although it had 
modernized its state tax jurisdiction analysis after Bellas Hess, 
it was now taking a step backwards.96  The Court re-affirmed 
 
 92. 504 U.S. at 303–04 (the North Dakota decision that the Court reviewed 
had refused to apply the holding in Bellas Hess because “wholesale changes in 
both the economy and the law made it inappropriate to follow Bellas Hess today”) 
(citing North Dakota v. Quill, 470 N. W. 2d 203, 213, 208 (N.D. 1991). See also 
infra notes 93 and 96 and accompanying text. 
 93. The Court stated, for example, that “Bellas Hess was decided in 1967, in 
the middle of [the Court’s shifting its Commerce Clause analysis] between 
formalism and pragmatism,” id. at 310; that “contemporary Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the 
first time today”, id. at 311, that the rule in the case was “artificial around the 
edges,” id. at 315, and that a similar rule had not been applied by the Court in 
any other instances, id. at 318.  The three Justices who filed a concurring opinion 
in Quill—who are the three Justices who took part in the case that continue to 
sit on the Court—stated that they would “not revisit the merits of [Bellas Hess], 
but would adhere to [the holding in that case] on the basis of stare decisis.” 504 
U.S. at 298, 319 (Scalia, J., Thomas, J. and Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice 
Kennedy, one of the three concurring Justices, recently stated that “the Quill 
majority acknowledged the prospect that its conclusion was wrong when the case 
was decided.” Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134 (2015) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 94. See id. at 317 (noting that “the Bellas Hess rule has engendered 
substantial reliance and has become part of the basic framework of a sizable 
industry”); id. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with this statement and 
noting that “the demands of the [stare decisis] doctrine are at their acme . . . 
where reliance interests are involved”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See 
also id. at 316 (“it is not unlikely that the mail-order industry’s dramatic growth 
over the last quarter century is due in part to the bright-line exemption from state 
taxation created in Bellas Hess”). See also Fatale, supra note 7, at 85. 
 95. Id. at 318 (noting that if it were to reverse the holding in Bellas Hess, the 
likely result would be “retroactive application” of the taxes in question resulting 
in “substantial unanticipated liability for mail order houses”).  See Fatale, supra 
note 7, at 86, 86 n.267.  Retroactive imposition of a sales or use tax collection duty 
can be particularly harsh, given that there is generally no longer any practical 
ability to collect the tax from the purchaser from whom the tax was initially due. 
 96. For example, the Court commented on the analysis in the state court 
decision it was reviewing, which had concluded that the Court’s rulings since 
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its anachronistic holding in Bellas Hess in part on the theory 
that Congress was better suited to address the questions 
presented—a result that the Court specifically invited.97  To 
facilitate this result, the Court explicitly based its decision on 
Commerce Clause grounds, and stated that it was no longer 
justified on Due Process Clause grounds, thus clearly enabling 
Congress to reconsider the rule.98 
a. Due Process and the Corporate Income Tax 
Even as the Court in Quill was removing the due process 
component from the state sales tax nexus analysis with the 
specific goal of eliciting Congressional action, the Court 
suggested that due process principles remained significant as 
a state tax jurisprudential tool.  The Court observed that 
claims concerning the application of the Commerce Clause and 
Due Process Clause in matters of state tax jurisdiction are 
“closely related.”99 The Court stated that the two clauses 
impose distinct limits on the taxing powers of the states, but 
suggested that those distinctions are not meaningful when 
evaluating a nexus question outside the realm of sales tax.100  
 
Bellas Hess had retreated from the formalistic logic of that case; Quill stated that, 
although it would re-affirm the holding in Bellas Hess, “it agreed with the state 
court’s assessment of the evolution of our cases.” Quill, 504 U.S. at 314.  See 
generally Fatale, supra note 7, at 84–85. 
 97. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318, 320 (Scalia, J. concurring). See also Walter 
Hellerstein, Supreme Court Says No State Use Tax Imposed on Mail Order 
Sellers, For Now, 77 J. TAX’N 120, 123–24 (1992) (stating that the Court’s 
language may have been intended, as a practical matter, to elicit a Congressional 
response).  Congress, however, has not acted. See infra notes 420-426 and 
accompanying text.  In hindsight, it seems apparent the Court would have been 
more likely to elicit a Congressional response had it ruled for the state—similar 
to the events that led to the enactment of Public Law 86-272. See supra note 68 
and accompanying text. 
 98. 504 U.S. at 308 (“Thus, to the extent that our decisions have indicated 
that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a State for the 
imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings as superseded 
by developments in the law of due process.”); id. at 318 (noting that Congress may 
have previously refrained from requiring mail order vendor to collect sales tax 
because it thought that “the Due Process Clause prohibit[ed] States from 
imposing such taxes”). 
 99. Id. at 305 (stating that in a number of cases involving jurisdictional 
claims by out-of-state sellers, the Court’s holdings have relied on both the Due 
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause; that “[d]ue process and commerce 
clause conceptions are not always sharply separable in dealing with 
[jurisdictional] problems;” and that therefore the Court has “not always been 
precise in distinguishing between the two [Clauses]”) (quotes omitted). 
 100. Id.  Quill referenced three examples of differences between the Clauses, 
none of which are typically relevant when a court evaluates state tax jurisdiction 
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The Court also clarified that it had not established a 
comparable “physical presence” rule that applies outside the 
context of a state’s sales tax.101  Therefore, the Court suggested 
that state corporate income tax nexus should be determined by 
applying due process principles.102  In the 2008 corporate 
income tax case, MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of 
Revenue,103 the Court acknowledged differences between the 
Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause, but stated “[t]he 
broad inquiry subsumed in both constitutional requirements is 
‘whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal 
relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the 
state’—that is, ‘whether the state has given anything for which 
 
in the context of a corporate income tax.  One example of a difference between the 
two Clauses is that under the Commerce Clause, unlike under the Due Process 
Clause, a court may strike down a state tax as discriminatory—a prospect that is 
not typically implicated when a state seeks to impose its tax jurisdiction.  See id. 
at 305 (citing the Court’s prior decision in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. 
Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987), and noting that case 
represented a situation where “while a State may, consistent with the Due 
Process Clause, have the authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the 
tax may nonetheless violate the Commerce Clause”).  In Tyler Pipe, a taxpayer 
was held subject to a state’s tax, whereas other taxpayers were able to show that 
the state’s taxing methodology was unconstitutionally discriminatory as applied 
to them.  See 482 U.S. at 253.  See also Fatale, supra note 7, at 63, 63 n.113 (citing 
recent Supreme Court discrimination cases, none of which involved a nexus 
claim).  A second example of a distinction between the two Constitutional clauses 
is that the Commerce Clause, unlike the Due Process Clause, has a broad 
affirmative aspect that authorizes Congress to generally regulate as to the 
national economy, including with respect to state taxes.  See id. at 318 (noting 
Congress’s ability to regulate under the Commerce Clause with respect to state 
taxation).  And of course, third, Quill itself created a practical distinction between 
the two clauses in the context of sales tax, by re-affirming the Court’s prior 
“physical presence” rule from National Bellas Hess, and justifying the rule on 
Commerce Clause but not due process grounds.  See generally id. at 306–18. 
 101. Id. at 314 (“we have not, in our review of other types of taxes, articulated 
the same physical-presence requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales 
and use taxes”) and 317 (“in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning 
other types of taxes we have not adopted a similar bright-line, physical-presence 
requirement”). 
 102. See Choper & Yin, supra note 52, at 202 (noting that although Quill 
purports to differentiate the “substantial nexus” prong of Complete Auto from the 
Due Process minimum contacts requirement, it provides no guidance as to the 
difference); Swain, supra note 83, at 342 (stating that the ruling in Quill that a 
taxpayer’s jurisdictional nexus with the state must include a Commerce Clause 
dimension as well as a Due Process dimension “makes it difficult to know how to 
fill Commerce Clause nexus with content” as “[m]ost of the nexus ‘burdens’ that 
come to mind are also due process concerns: notice, forseeability, fundamental 
fairness, and the like”). 
 103. 128 S. Ct. 1501 (2008). 
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it can ask return.’ ” 104  This reference was to the Court’s 
longstanding due process inquiry as applied in state tax cases 
evaluating the breadth of the states’ taxing powers.105 
In the aftermath of Quill, a series of state tax cases upheld 
the imposition of a corporate income tax in whole or in part on 
the theory that no physical presence standard applies to such 
taxes.106  Instead of applying the physical presence test, the 
 
 104. 128 S. Ct. at 1505 (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 
307, 315 (1982), in turn quoting Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 
(1940)).  Meadwestvaco pertained to a question of corporate income tax 
apportionment and not nexus, but the Court analogized between the two 
inquiries, stating that both evaluate the states’ ability “to tax extraterritorial 
values.”  Id. at 1502.  See also id. (“The Commerce Clause and the Due Process 
Clause impose distinct but parallel limitations on a State’s power to tax out-of-
state activities.”); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 
778 (1992) (stating that in nexus and apportionment questions, the Court is 
“guided by the basic principle that the State’s power to tax an individual’s or 
corporation’s activities is justified by the protection, opportunities and benefits 
the State confers on those activities.”). 
 105. See Fatale, supra note 7, at 84 and n.252–53. See also infra note 104 and 
accompanying text (citing Court cases with similar language). 
 106. Geoffrey Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13,18 (S.C. 
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993) (nexus found with respect to an out-of-
state corporation engaged in in-state licensing of trademarks to a related party); 
Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dept., 131 P.3d 27, 39 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2001), writ quashed, 131 P.3d 22 (N.M. 2005) (same); A&F Trademark, Inc. v. 
Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 821 (2005) 
(same); Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 908 A.2d 176, 176 (N.J. 
2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1131 (2007) (same); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax 
Comm’n, 132 P.3d 632, 638 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005) (same); Bridges v. Geoffrey, 
Inc., 984 So.2d 115, 128 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2008), writ denied, 978 S.2d 370 (La. 
2008) (same); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 453 Mass. 17 (2009), cert. 
denied, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 4584 (2009) (same); Tax Comm’r v. MBNA America 
Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 232, 234 (W.Va. 2006), cert. denied, FIA Card 
Services, N.A. v. Tax Comm’r, 551 U.S. 1141 (2007) (nexus found with respect to 
an out-of-state corporation engaged in in-state credit card lending); Capital One 
Bank v. Comm’r of Revenue, 453 Mass. 1, 15 (2009), cert. denied, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 
4616 (2009) (same); MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Indiana Dep’t of State 
Revenue, 895 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2008) (same); KFC Corp v. Iowa Dept 
of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 322, 328 (Iowa 2010) cert. denied, 2011 WL 4530160 
(2011) (nexus found with respect to an out-of-state corporation engaged in 
licensing trademarks and related intangible property to unrelated in-state 
franchisees). See also Borden Chemicals and Plastics v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73, 
80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000), app. denied, 731 N.E.2d 762 (Ill. 2000) (court states there 
is no physical presence requirement outside the context of sales and use tax; finds 
non-resident corporate partner that owns a partnership interest in a partnership 
doing business in the state is subject to the state’s corporate income tax); Couchot 
v. State Lottery Comm., 74 Ohio St. 3d 417, 424–25 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 
810 (1996) (court states there is no physical presence requirement outside the 
context of sales and use tax; finds non-resident lottery ticket winners are subject 
to the state’s personal income tax); Gen. Motors Corp. v City of Seattle, 25 P.3d 
1022, 1029 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001), pet. rev. denied en banc, 84 P.3d 1230 (Wash. 
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focus of these courts was whether the taxpayer was doing 
business in the state or was otherwise significantly exploiting 
the state’s economic market or its resources.107  Therefore, 
although the cases were evaluated under the Commerce 
Clause, the logic resembled due process analysis.108  Several of 
the cases suggested that the state tax jurisdictional standard 
might require a certain threshold of in-state activity109—a 
higher level of contacts than is typically required in non-tax 
adjudicative jurisdiction cases.110  But this general line of 
analysis focusing on in-state market exploitation is 
 
2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1056 (2002) (court states there is no physical 
presence requirement outside the context of sales and use tax; finds corporation 
engaged in wholesale sales activity with respect to in-state car retailers subject 
to the state’s gross receipts tax). 
     Two cases are sometimes cited as representing a contrary holding: Rylander 
v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. App. 2000) and J.C. Penney Nat’l 
Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 927 
(2000).  For a critique of the notion that these cases are in fact to the contrary, 
see Geoffrey, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 132 P.3d 632, 638 (2005) and Bridges 
v. Geoffrey, Inc., 984 So.2d 115, 127 (2008).  See also KFC Corp, 792 N.W.2d at 
322 (distinguishing Bandag); Geoffrey, 453 Mass. at 24 (same); Capital One, 453 
Mass. at 13 n.16 (noting that the logic in J.C. Penney Nat’l Bank was later 
questioned by the same court that decided the case in America Online, Inc. v. 
Johnson, No. M2001-00927 COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2002)). 
 107. See generally the cases cited at supra note 106.  See Michael T. Fatale, 
State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical ‘Physical Presence’ Constitutional 
Standard, 54 TAX LAWYER 105, 111–16, 142 (2000). 
 108. See generally the cases cited at supra note 106. 
 109. See KFC Corp., 792 N.W.2d at 328 (“When a company earns hundreds of 
thousands of dollars from sales to Iowa customers arising from the licensing of 
intangibles associated with the fast-food business, we conclude that the Supreme 
Court would engage in a realistic substance-over-form assessment that would 
allow a state legislature to require the payment of the company’s fair share of 
taxes without violating the dormant Commerce Clause”); Capital One Bank, 453 
Mass. at 15–16 (finding nexus where the out-of-state banks “were soliciting and 
conducting significant credit card business in the Commonwealth with hundreds 
of thousands of Massachusetts residents, generating millions of dollars in income 
for the . . . banks”); MBNA America Bank, 640 S.E.2d at 235 (“[A]n entity’s 
exploitation of the market must be greater in degree than under the Due Process 
standard so that its economic presence can be characterized as significant or 
substantial”).  See also Alan B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise of Economic 
Nexus, 13 FL. TAX. REV. 157, 181–87 (2012) (evaluating state statutes that assert 
corporate income tax jurisdiction based upon a taxpayer’s purposeful exploitation 
of the state’s economic market, including those that require a certain threshold 
of in-state sales). 
 110. See Thimmesch, supra note 109, at 181, 187, 187 n.179 (referring to 
“heightened” state corporate income tax nexus standards that require in-state 
“market exploitation” or a “level of economic connection” that exceeds the 
“minimum connections required by the Due Process Clause or the simple 
derivation of revenue from a state.”). 
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nonetheless consistent with due process principles.111 
While the Supreme Court has never affirmed the result in 
any of the various corporate income tax nexus cases that were 
decided in favor of the states post-Quill, the Court has 
repeatedly denied taxpayer petitions for a writ of certiorari in 
these cases.112  The denial of such a petition does not constitute 
a judicial precedent,113 but these continued denials nonetheless 
seem legally meaningful.  The re-affirmation of Bellas Hess in 
Quill was based in part on the Court’s concern for the financial 
well-being of mail order vendors that reasonably relied upon 
Bellas Hess, including the concern that these vendors would 
otherwise be forced to pay large amounts of retroactive 
taxes. 114  Similarly, the state courts concluding that Quill’s 
holding is limited to sales and use tax have also relied upon 
prior language of the Court, as stated in Quill.  If the Court 
reversed the results in these state tax cases twenty-plus years 
after Quill there would be significant retroactive revenue 
consequences to the states.115 
b. Due Process and the Sales Tax 
Quill dispensed with what would have been the otherwise 
applicable due process inquiry in sales tax nexus cases in favor 
of a Commerce Clause physical presence standard.116  The 
Court concluded, as in its prior case, Bellas Hess,117 that a mail 
order vendor engaged in substantial in-state market 
 
 111. See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. at 308 (“[s]o long as a commercial actor’s efforts 
are purposefully directed toward residents of another State”—for example, 
through “continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a State”. . . 
such actor “clearly has fair warning that its activity may subject it to the 
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”) (quotes omitted). 
 112. See the cases referenced supra note 106. 
 113. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 85 (1995). 
 114. See supra notes 94–95. 
 115. See Joe Huddleston, MTC Supports Economic Presence Standards for 
Businesses, St. Tax Today, May 11, 2012 (noting an estimate of the Congressional 
Budget Office that a federal law preempting the jurisdictional standard applied 
in these state tax cases would cost the states about $2 billion in the first year of 
enactment and at least that much in subsequent years).  Cf. United Haulers Ass’n 
v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 342–43 (2007) 
(“Unlike private enterprise, government is vested with the responsibility of 
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. . . . These important 
responsibilities set state and local government apart from a typical private 
business.”). 
 116. 504 U.S. at 317–18. 
 117. 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
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exploitation118 could not be held subject to the state’s use tax 
collection duty based merely upon the “non-physical” in-state 
contacts of mail and common carrier.119  In the aftermath of 
Quill, the application of this physical presence standard was 
clear on facts that substantially resembled the facts evaluated 
in Quill, but often unclear otherwise.120 
One fundamental difficulty with applying the Quill 
physical presence standard to a corporation making sales into 
a state is that a corporation is a mere legal construct that has 
no inherent physical attributes.121  Therefore, any question 
probing a corporation’s physical presence first requires a 
determination as to what in-state representational acts or 
property of that corporation can create physical presence.122  In 
such cases, whether the standard is met logically depends on 
the “quality and the nature” of the corporation’s contacts in 
relation to the purposes that underlie the Quill physical 
presence rule.123  Since Quill was primarily intended to protect 
mail order vendors that had reasonably relied upon the Court’s 
prior holding in Bellas Hess,124 the physical presence rule of 
 
 118. The company made almost $1 million in annual in-state sales to about 
3,000 customers in the state.  Quill, 504 U.S. at 302.  These sales were the result 
of 24 tons of catalogs and flyers mailed by the company into the state every year.  
Id. at 502. 
 119. This was “the Bellas Hess rule” upheld by the Court.  See Quill, 504 U.S. 
at 311, 317–18.  See also infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Fatale, supra note 107, at 118–30.  See also Buehner Block Co. v. Wyo. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 139 P.3d 1150, 1158 (Wyo. 2006) (“the bright-line rule [of Quill] 
simply holds that, where there is no physical presence in a state, and the only 
connection between the state and the entity or transaction is by mail or common 
carrier, there is no “substantial nexus” that will support imposition of a sales or 
use tax . . . . While mail or common carrier delivery, alone, cannot support a state’s 
taxing authority, neither does the existence of either of those factors, ipso facto, 
prohibit the imposition of a [sales or use] tax.  Instead, determining the existence 
or non-existence of “substantial nexus” is a fact-driven inquiry, different in each 
case.”). 
 121. Acknowledgement of this general point ushered in the Court’s modern 
due process jurisprudence, beginning with International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310 (1945). See infra notes 179–86 and accompanying text. 
 122. A substantially similar question formed the basis for the Court’s seminal 
due process case, International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  See 
infra notes 179–86 and accompanying text. 
 123. Cf. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (“Whether due process is satisfied 
must depend . . . upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair 
and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due 
process clause to insure.”); Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211-212 (1960) (the 
constitutional “test” for jurisdiction “is simply the nature and extent of the 
activities” of the corporation in the state). 
 124. Quill, 504 U.S. at 301 (noting that the case applied, as in Bellas Hess, to 
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Quill should be applied to effectuate that purpose.125  Applying 
Quill to protect the reasonable reliance interests of taxpayers 
has the effect of applying due process-like fairness principles 
to determine whether the taxpayer has met the physical 
presence test.126 
State sales tax cases decided post-Quill are generally 
consistent with this analysis.  For example, Quill was decided 
at a time when the Internet was not yet widely used to make 
retail sales, and therefore such vendors were not within the 
specific class that the Court sought to protect.  Nonetheless, it 
is generally understood that when a vendor’s contacts with a 
state are limited to direct sales solicitation through the 
Internet and product deliveries by common carrier, the Quill 
safe harbor should apply.127  Similarly, it is not the case that 
every in-state representational activity or property interest 
will establish sales tax physical presence nexus.128  Most state 
 
a state’s attempt to apply a use tax collection duty to “an out-of-state mail-order 
house . . . whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier 
or the United States mail.”); 315 (“under Bellas Hess, such vendors are free from 
state-imposed duties to collect sales and use taxes”); and 317–18 (concluding that 
the “Bellas Hess rule remains good law” and that it is not “time . . . to renounce 
the bright-line test of Bellas Hess”). 
 125. See Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation, ¶ 19.02[3][b] (3d ed. 2011) (Supp. 
No. 3 2010) (“Many of the reasons the Court advanced for adhering to the 
physical-presence standard relate principally, if not exclusively, to sales and use 
taxes on the mail-order industry. . . . Quill, therefore, may arguably be read to 
have established a ‘bright-line’ physical-presence standard only for sales and use 
taxes on the mail-order industry alone.”) (quoted in Adam Thimmesch, The 
Fading Bright Line of Physical Presence: Did KFC Corporation v. Iowa 
Department of Revenue Give States the Secret Recipe for Repudiating Quill?, 100 
KY. L.J. 339, 350 n.88 (2012)).  See also Buehner Block Co., 139 P.3d at 1158 (Wyo. 
2006) (applying sales tax to a remote vendor that shipped purchased concrete 
blocks to the state by common carrier and that lacked any other physical contacts 
with the state where the vendor had previously obtained a state sales tax vendor 
license and was collecting sales tax on similar in-state transactions). 
 126. Cf. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312 (“Due process centrally concerns the 
fundamental fairness of governmental activity . . . We have, therefore, often 
identified ‘notice’ or ‘fair warning’ as the analytic touchstone of due process nexus 
analysis.”). 
 127. See Fatale, supra note 107, at 106. 
 128. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 302 n.1, 315 n.8 (noting that the in-state license of 
software included on “three floppy disks” resulted in an in-state presence that 
was a mere “slightest presence” and therefore insufficient to establish state tax 
nexus).  Compare Texas CPA Hearing No. 106,632, Docket No. 304-13-5657.26 
(Tex. Cptr. Pub Acct. Sept. 19, 2014) (electronic licenses of vendor software and 
digital images downloaded in the state is conceded to constitute “tangible 
personal property” under state law and, where the volume of such sales is 
significant, held to exceed a mere slightest presence therefore establishing state 
tax nexus on the part of the vendor). 
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courts have assumed in factually difficult cases that the nature 
and extent of the contacts must be considered.129  Using this 
approach, state courts generally conclude that where a 
vendor’s in-state “physical” presence exceeds a mere “slightest” 
presence, those contacts are sufficient to establish sales tax 
nexus, particularly if the in-state contacts assist in the 
vendor’s generation of significant in-state sales.130 
Scripto v. Carson, Inc.131 and Tyler Pipe v. Wash. Dept. of 
Rev.,132 two Supreme Court cases decided prior to Quill, assist 
in the sales tax nexus analysis.  Those cases establish that 
certain in-state activities of an independent contractor will 
establish “physical presence” sales tax nexus on the part of a 
corporation.  Scripto held that independent sales persons can 
establish nexus on the part of an out-of-state vendor and 
reasoned that to conclude otherwise would permit vendors 
using salaried sales representatives to engage in tax avoidance 
by instead using independent representatives.133  Tyler Pipe 
similarly determined that sales tax nexus was established 
based on in-state sales-related activity performed by 
 
 129. See, e.g., Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 86 N.Y.2d 165, 179–
80 (1995) (nexus found where taxpayer representatives made only 12 visits to the 
state in 3 years that were “systematic”—with each visit resulting in meetings 
with up to 19 wholesale customers who during the 3-year period were responsible 
for about 15% of the company’s total in-state sales); Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. 
Care Computer Systems, Inc., 4 P.3d 469, 472 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (nexus 
determined based on the “volume” and “nature” of the taxpayer’s in-state 
activity).  See also Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. at 211–12 (1960) (finding sales tax 
nexus applying a test that “is simply the nature and extent of the [in-state] 
activities of the [taxpayer]”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 
(1945) (“Whether due process is satisfied [in a case pertaining to adjudicative 
jurisdiction] must depend . . . upon the quality and nature of the activity.”); KFC 
Corp. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 314 (2008) (stating in the context 
of a corporate income tax case that the Supreme Court’s “dormant Commerce 
Clause nexus requirement . . . has emphasized a flexible approach based on 
economic reality and the nature of the activity giving rise to the income that the 
state seeks to tax”). 
 130. See, e.g., Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 654 N.E.2d 954, 960–
61 (N.Y. 1995) (the taxpayer’s presence need only “be demonstrably more than a 
slightest presence”) (internal quotes omitted); Brown’s Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 
665 N.E.2d 795, 803 (1996) (holding that the taxpayer had “established more than 
a slight physical presence within the [s]tate”); Magnetek Controls, 562 N.W.2d, 
219, 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (“tax obligations may be imposed, consistent with 
the Commerce Clause, on taxpayers with demonstrably more than a slightest 
presence in a state”) (internal quotes omitted).  See also infra note 128 (citing 
cases evaluating the “slightest presence” nexus standard). 
 131. 362 U.S. 207 (1960). 
 132. 483 U.S. 232 (1987). 
 133. 362 U.S. at 210–11. 
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independent contractors.134  Tyler Pipe stated, “the crucial 
factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in 
this state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated 
with the taxpayer’s ability to establish and maintain a market 
in this state for the sales.”135 
Although helpful, the decisions in Scripto and Tyler Pipe 
do not always clearly resolve the nexus analysis in particular 
cases,136 thus creating the need to also consider the taxpayer’s 
reasonable reliance interests vis-à-vis Quill.  New York State’s 
highest court provided an often-cited restatement of the 
applicable sales tax nexus standard in Orvis Co. v. Tax 
Tribunal137—that sales tax nexus can be established “by the 
presence in the taxing State of the vendor’s property or the 
conduct of economic activities in the taxing State performed by 
the vendor’s personnel or on its behalf.”138  However, the Orvis 
re-formulation of the applicable nexus test also begs the 
question in some cases as to what particular property interests 
or economic activities will suffice.139 
Recent state cases have extended Scripto and Tyler Pipe to 
find sales tax nexus where unrelated in-state persons solicited 
or enhanced sales on behalf of an out-of-state vendor for 
consideration when the in-state person or persons: (1) 
 
 134. 483 U.S. at 251. 
 135. Id. at 250.  See also 482 U.S. at 249 (noting that “[t]he sales 
representatives acted daily on behalf of Tyler Pipe in calling on its customers and 
soliciting orders.  They have long-established and valuable relationships with 
Tyler Pipe’s customers. Through sales contacts, the representatives maintain and 
improve the name recognition, market share, goodwill, and individual customer 
relations of Tyler Pipe.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Scholastic Books Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 38 A.3d 1183, 
1199 (Conn. 2012) (“We first observe that the language in Bellas Hess and Quill 
describing Scripto as representing the [Supreme Court’s] ‘furthest’ extension of 
the state’s taxing power was no more than an observation concerning the state of 
the law at that time, and was not necessarily intended to mean that a substantial 
nexus between the out-of-state retailer and the state could not be found in other, 
as of yet undefined, circumstances.”) (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 306); Orvis Co., 654 
N.E.2d at 185 (noting the Supreme Court’s statement in Scripto v. Carson that 
its holding in that case “represents the furthest constitutional reach to date of a 
State’s power to deputize an out-of-state retailer as its collection agent for a use 
tax” and stating “[w]e believe that the instant cases go ‘further’ ” ) (citing Quill, 
504 U.S. at 306). 
 137. 86 N.Y.2d 165 (1995). 
 138. Id. at 178.  See Borders Online v. State Bd. Of Equaliz., 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 
176, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (citing this standard); Fatale, supra note 107, at 120 
n.100 (citing cases that have relied upon this standard). 
 139. See generally the cases referenced supra note 138. 
590  SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:55 
facilitated sales but were not professional sales persons,140 (2) 
received commissions based on completed sales that resulted 
from a referral from the person’s Internet website,141 or (3) 
performed ancillary sales activity for the vendor, such as the 
performance of warranty work142 or in-state product delivery 
and installation.143 
The logic in Tyler Pipe was also recently extended to a fact 
pattern in which separately incorporated in-state bookstores 
engaged in “cross-marketing”—including through the shared 
use of trademarks—with an out-of-state affiliated vendor that 
was making similar in-state Internet sales.144  Although state 
 
 140. See, e.g., Scholastic Books Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 38 A.3d 1183, 
1199 (Conn. 2012) (school teachers facilitating in-state sales on behalf of out-of-
state bookseller); Scholastic Books Clubs, Inc. v. Farr, 373 S.W.3d 558, 564–65 
(Tenn. 2012) (same).  Similar earlier cases reached mixed conclusions.  See 
Fatale, supra note 107, at 125–27. 
 141. See Overstock.com, LLC v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation and 
Finance, 20 N.Y.3d 586 (2013), cert. denied, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 8648 (2013) (tax 
jurisdiction established for out-of-state Internet vendor based on an “Associates 
Program” through which in-state third parties agreed to place links on their own 
websites that, when clicked, directed users to the vendor’s website; the Associates 
were compensated by commissions determined based on clicks and subsequent 
online purchases); Amazon.com, LLC v. New York State Dep’t of Tax and 
Finance, 20 N.Y. 3d 586 (2013) (same), cert. denied, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 8717 (2013).  
The court noted that the in-state persons were “not merely engaged to post 
passive advertisements on their websites,” but rather were paid to “actively 
solicit business in this state.”  Id. at 596. 
 142. See Dell Catalog Sales L.P. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 199 P.3d 863 
(N.M. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1616 (2009).  See also Robert D. Plattner, 
Daniel Smirlock, & Mary Ellen Ladouceur, A New Way Forward for Remote 
Vendor Sales Tax Collection, STATE TAX TODAY, (Jan. 18, 2010), at 194 (citing the 
2008 New Mexico Dell case as an example of the circumstance that “under some 
fact patterns, states could appropriately assert nexus over an out-of-state seller 
based on a combination of the in-state activities of an ‘independent company’ 
providing services to tangible personal property purchased from the out-of-state 
seller, and the nature of the relationship between the out-of-state seller and in-
state service provider”). 
 143. See Town Crier, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 733 N.E.2d 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2000); Furnitureland South v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No. C-97-37872 OC 
(Md. Cir. Ct August 13, 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 771 A.2d 1061 (Md. 2001). 
See also Arco Bldg. Systems, Inc. v. Chumley, 209 S.W.3d 63, 74-75 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2006), appeal denied, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1002 (Tenn. Oct. 30, 2006) (nexus 
found with respect to out-of-state vendor that sold buildings in the state based 
upon the in-state activities of unrelated parties that manufactured and delivered 
the buildings). 
 144. Barnesandnoble.com LLC, 303 P.3d 824, 825 (N.M. 2013).  See Borders 
Online, LLC v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) 
(similar).  Barnesandnoble.com specifically relied upon the fact that Tyler Pipe 
had reasoned that an in-state contractor’s activities could establish nexus on the 
part of a remote vendor when those activities operated to enhance the vendor’s 
“name recognition, market share, goodwill, and individual customer relations.”  
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courts have generally concluded that there is no physical 
presence nexus standard that applies to the states’ corporate 
income tax, two state cases have similarly concluded that in-
state trademark licensing activity can establish corporate 
income tax nexus, in part because the resulting income-
generating activity results in the functional equivalent of 
physical presence.145   
Scripto and Tyler Pipe have also been recently applied to 
a corporation not otherwise present in the state that booked in-
state hotel reservations through its website for a fee.146  The 
court’s reasoning was that the services provided by the 
unrelated in-state hotels that contracted with the corporation 
were “significantly associated with [the company’s] ability to 
establish and maintain a market [in the state] for its sales.”147 
 
Barnesandnoble.com LLC, 303 P.3d at 827, 829.  See Plattner, et al., supra note 
142, at 194-195 (discussing this general fact pattern). See also Harley-Davidson, 
Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 237 Cal. App. 4th 193, 218 (2015). (corporate income 
tax case states that under Tyler Pipe “the third party’s in-state conduct need not 
be sales related; it need only be an integral and crucial aspect of the business”) 
(quotes omitted). 
 145. See KFC Corp v. Iowa Dept of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 324 (2010) cert. 
denied, 2011WL 4530160 (2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court would likely find 
intangibles owned by KFC, but utilized in a fast-food business by its franchisees 
that are firmly anchored within the state, would be regarded as having a 
sufficient connection to Iowa to amount to the functional equivalent of ‘physical 
presence’ under Quill); Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dept., 131 P.3d 
27, 39 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001), writ quashed, 131 P.3d 22 (N.M. 2005) (“Considering 
the Quill standard in the context of this case, we conclude that the combination 
of Kmart Corporation’s activities in New Mexico, together with the tangible 
presence of KPI’s marks, constitutes the functional equivalent of physical 
presence as afforded by the independent representatives in Scripto and Tyler 
Pipe.”).  See also supra note 106 (citing additional cases that have found corporate 
income tax nexus based upon the in-state licensing of intangible property); 
Borden Chems. and Plastics v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73, 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) 
(court states there is no physical presence requirement outside the context of 
sales tax such that a non-resident corporate partner is subject to the state’s 
income tax, but also concludes that such a partner of a partnership doing business 
in the state would meet a physical presence standard; court notes also that 
“Illinois has afforded protection and benefits to the Operating Partnership’s 
activities and transactions within the state and that these services provided by 
Illinois have helped give rise to the income that is distributed to [the partner] 
plaintiff”). 
 146.  Travelscape v. South Carolina Dep’t of Revenue, 391 S.C. 89 (S.C. 2011). 
 147.  Id. at 106-107.  See also Travelocity.com v. Wyoming Dep’t of Revenue, 
329 P.3d 131, 148-150 (Wyo. 2014) (similar).  See also City of Charleston v. 
Hotels.com, 586 F.Supp. 2d 538, 544 (2008) (stating the court has “no hesitation 
in ruling” that the physical presence rule does not apply since the online travel 
companies “are alleged to have proactively booked and leased hotel rooms and 
other accommodations that are physically located [in the state].”). 
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2. Discrimination and the Evaluation of State Tax 
Burdens Post-Quill Corp. v. North Dakota148 
Complete Auto replaced the Court’s prior Commerce 
Clause test for evaluating the legitimacy of a state tax, the 
direct-indirect burdens inquiry, with four tests—one that 
probes discrimination and three that generally evaluate due 
process principles.149  Therefore, one consequence of Complete 
Auto in state tax cases has been not only to dispense with the 
Court’s previous direct-indirect burdens test, but also to 
dispense with the general consideration of taxpayer burdens of 
any type.  This is because the consideration of such burdens, to 
the extent such questions remain relevant, are now subsumed 
under the three non-discrimination prongs of Complete Auto, 
which focus on whether a state tax meets due process fairness 
concerns.150  Consistent with this point, when the Court in 
Quill re-affirmed the “physical presence” rule established by 
Bellas Hess, it reasoned that this rule—an interpretation of 
Complete Auto’s first, nexus prong—served to address the 
potential prospect of an “undue” taxpayer burden.151  The 
Court’s suggestion was that outside this “bright line” 
standard—and the Complete Auto prongs more generally—
there is to be no independent, general consideration of such 
burdens.152  
In 1995, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson 
Lines,153 the Supreme Court upheld a states sale tax that was 
challenged as imposing an “undue tax burden” because the 
 
 148. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 149. See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text. 
 150. See, e.g., American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 
291 (1987) (“[W]hen the measure of a tax bears no relationship to the taxpayers’ 
presence or activities in a State, a court may properly conclude under the fourth 
prong of the Complete Auto Transit test that the State is imposing an undue 
burden on interstate commerce.”).  See also supra notes 80–83 and accompanying 
text. 
 151. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (noting that “undue burdens . . . may be avoided . . . 
by the demarcation of a discrete realm of commercial activity that is free from 
interstate taxation. . . [like the Bellas Hess] safe harbor for vendors whose only 
connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by common carrier or the 
United States mail.”) (internal quotes omitted). See also id. at 313 (“The first and 
fourth prongs [of Complete Auto] . . . limit the reach of state taxing authority so 
as to ensure that state taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce); id. 
at 325 (White, J., dissenting) (“parts two and three of the Complete Auto test . . . 
[ensure] that interstate commerce not be unduly burdened”). 
 152. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. 
 153.  514 U.S. 179 (1995). 
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Court concluded that the tax complied with each of Complete 
Auto’s four prongs.154  Since 1995, the Court has taken several 
cases that have probed state tax discrimination within the 
meaning of the Commerce Clause.155  However, only one case, 
a fair apportionment case that was later dismissed for further 
state court proceedings, considered any of the other three 
prongs of Complete Auto.156  State cases that probe the three 
non-discrimination prongs of Complete Auto remain common, 
but since Quill no state case has found that a state tax imposed 
an “undue burden” on interstate commerce apart from 
consideration of the Complete Auto standards.157 
 
 154.  Id. at 178, 183-200. 
 155. See Fatale, supra note 7, at n.113 and accompanying text. 
 156. See generally MeadWestvaco, 128 S. Ct. 149 (2008).  
Recently, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision affirmed a Maryland opinion 
striking down a component of that state’s personal income tax on dormant 
Commerce Clause grounds.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
Although the lower Maryland court decision had been decided on both fair 
apportionment and discrimination grounds, see id. at 1793, the Supreme Court 
affirmed only on the discrimination basis, see id. at 1795, 1803-1804.  The 
Maryland decision had considered the Court’s pre-existing doctrine pertaining to 
“internal consistency”—which evaluates “double” or “multiple” taxation—to be a 
principle that evaluates fair apportionment.  Comptroller v. Wynne, 64 A.3d 453, 
463-470 (Md. 2013).  However, the Supreme Court’s majority decision re-posited 
that doctrine as one that evaluates discrimination.  See 135 S. Ct. at 1803-1804.  
The Court’s emphasis on the discrimination principle in the Wynne case is 
striking—the notion is specifically referred to in the majority decision 44 times, 
whereas fair apportionment is mentioned only 4 times—3 times in the Court’s 
summary of the lower Maryland court decision.  See generally Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 
1787. 
     The Wynne majority specifically endeavored to defend the dormant Commerce 
Clause against critiques leveled by the dissenting Justices Thomas and Scalia 
that the doctrine is not rooted in the Constitution.  Id. at 1806-07.  However, that 
defense—even apart from resting on only 5 votes—was narrow.  The majority’s 
defense specifically referenced—consistent with its analysis in the case more 
generally—only the importance of addressing state tax discrimination as 
implemented through “tariffs” and as implied by the state-created threat of 
double taxation.  Id. at 1804, 1807-09. 
 157. A LEXIS search performed for this period reveals only three cases where 
a taxpayer claiming that a tax imposed an “undue burden” prevailed—and in two 
of those cases the state charge at issue was arguably not even a tax.  See American 
Business USA Corp. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 4D13-1472 (Fla. 1st DCA Nov. 12 2014) 
(concluding imposition of a use tax imposed an undue burden because it violated 
the Quill substantial nexus test); American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. New 
Jersey, 852 A.2d 142, 166 (N.J. 2004) (annual hazardous waste transporter 
registration fees assessed against out-of-state transporters are construed to be 
“taxes” and struck down under Complete Auto’s fourth prong as imposing an 
undue burden because the fees were unrelated to the transponders’ level of 
activity in the state; also, the fees are struck down as failing Complete Auto’s 
prongs of fair apportionment and discrimination); Radio Common Carriers of 
New York v. New York, 601 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct., NY County 1993) (similar 
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Outside the state tax area, the “undue burden” standard 
is technically still relevant as a matter of Supreme Court 
precedent as one of two tests that evaluate whether a state 
regulation—as opposed to a state tax—violates the principles 
of the Commerce Clause.158  Even in this context, however, the 
Court has been reluctant to apply the undue burden test 
because it invites subjective judicial determinations similar to 
those that characterized the Court’s Commerce Clause state 
tax cases prior to Complete Auto.159 
II. DUE PROCESS JURISDICTION FOR STATE TAX 
PURPOSES POST-J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. 
NICASTRO160 
Recently, the Supreme Court has decided several cases 
that apply due process principles to the determination of 
adjudicative jurisdiction, including the specific jurisdiction 
case, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.161  These cases 
are relevant to the state tax jurisdiction inquiry because the 
state tax and adjudicative jurisdiction due process inquiries 
are “comparable.”162  These cases are potentially important to 
the state tax analysis because the relevant constitutional 
limitations that apply to state tax jurisdiction now derive 
primarily from the Due Process Clause.163 
The Due Process Clause is set forth in the 14th 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1868, and 
provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”164  The Due Process 
 
analysis as in American Trucking with respect to “special fee” imposed on “paging 
devices”). 
 158. See Fatale, supra note 7 at notes 99–100 and accompanying text.  The 
second of the two tests is whether the state regulation is discriminatory.  See id. 
 159. See Fatale, supra note 7 at notes 97–106 and accompanying text.  See also 
supra notes 59–76 and accompanying text.  In the regulatory context, evaluation 
of an “undue burden” requires a balancing of the burdens of the regulation as 
measured against the state’s interest in implementing the regulation.  See 
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) 
(quoting Pike v. Bruce, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).  That approach is particularly 
problematic in the state tax context because it leaves “much room for controversy 
and confusion and little in the way of precise guidance to the states in their 
exercise of their indispensable power of taxation.”  See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 
v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 403 (1984). 
 160. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 161. Id.  See infra notes 169–172 and accompanying text. 
 162. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308. 
 163. See generally supra notes 96–147 and accompanying text. 
 164. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (stating, “[N]or shall any state deprive any 
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Clause has been applied to corporations in state tax cases 
dating back to the late 1800’s.165  In state tax jurisdiction cases, 
the longstanding due process question is whether the state has 
given anything for which it can ask a return.166  More 
specifically, “[t]he Due Process Clause demands that there 
exist some definite link, some minimum connection, between a 
state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.”167 
A. International Shoe Co. v. Washington168 and the Birth 
of Modern Due Process Analysis 
There are three recent U.S. Supreme Court cases 
construing the Due Process Clause that have generated 
considerable attention: Daimler AG v. Bauman,169 J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,170 and Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, SA v. Brown.171  These cases pay tribute to the 
1945 Supreme Court case, International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington.172  Goodyear called International Shoe 
 
person of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law”). 
 165. See, e.g., Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 226 
(1897). 
 166. See MeadWestvaco, 128 S. Ct. at 1505 (stating the question as “ ‘ whether 
the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, 
opportunities and benefits given by the state’ ” —that is, “ ‘ whether the state has 
given anything for which it can ask return.’ ” ) (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho 
Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982), in turn quoting Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney 
Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)).  MeadWestvaco stated that this same question also 
informs Commerce Clause jurisdictional questions.  See id.  See also supra note 
64 and accompanying text (Court statements to the effect that, notwithstanding 
the Commerce Clause, interstate commerce can be made to pay its fair share of 
state tax). 
 167. MeadWestvaco, 128 S. Ct. at 1505 (quoting Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 306, 
in turn quoting Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 344–45 (1954)). 
MeadWestvaco noted that this due process limitation “on a State’s power to tax 
out-of-state activities” is distinct from that applied under the Commerce Clause 
but nonetheless “parallel.”  Id. 
 168. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 169. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 170. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 171. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 172. 326 U. S. 310 (1945).  A fourth due process case decided in 2014, Walden 
v. Fiore, also repeatedly references International Shoe.  See 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121–
23 (2014).  But Walden is not generally relevant to this Article because the 
defendant in Walden was an individual that was not engaged in business activity.  
See id. at  1119.  Also, Walden was admitted by the Court to be an easy case that 
could be decided applying “[w]ell-established principles of personal jurisdiction.” 
Id. at 1126.  See John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction After Bauman 
and Fiore, LEWIS & CLARK LAW SCH. LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER No. 2014-
22, (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2535367## (noting Walden’s “modest intentions” to “reinforce the minimum 
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“pathmarking;”173 Daimler called the opinion “canonical.”174  
McIntyre resulted in three separate decisions with distinct 
reasoning, but “[a]ll nine Justices agreed that . . . the 
International Shoe test provided the appropriate analysis.”175  
Even Quill, the most recent Supreme Court case to evaluate 
due process jurisdiction for state tax purposes, referred to 
International Shoe as the “seminal case” pertaining to such 
jurisdiction.176  International Shoe, which evaluated a state tax 
imposed upon an interstate business,177 first articulated the 
jurisdictional “minimum contacts” test that continues to be 
applied in adjudicative and state tax jurisdiction cases.178  
International Shoe, therefore, is an appropriate place to begin 
an analysis of due process jurisdiction as applied to state 
taxation. 
International Shoe evaluated adjudicative jurisdiction as 
relevant to a multistate corporation that was seeking to avoid 
the imposition of a state tax.179  The tax in question was 
imposed upon employers conducting business in the state for 
the purpose of providing a fund to be used for financial 
 
contacts test”). 
 173. 131 S. Ct. at 2851. 
 174. 134 S. Ct. at 754. 
 175. Henry S. Noyes, The Persistent Problem of Purposeful Availment, 45 
CONN. L. REV. 41, 60 (2012).  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in McIntyre argued that 
Kennedy’s plurality opinion is inconsistent with the spirit of International Shoe.  
131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I take heart that the plurality 
opinion does not speak for the Court, for that opinion would take a giant step 
away from the ‘notions of fair play and substantial justice’ underlying 
International Shoe.”) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).  Some 
commentators have agreed.  See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional 
Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-Buried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 
581–82 (1995); Eric Schepard, The Battle for the Soul of International Shoe: Why 
the Author of International Shoe would Condemn the Nicastro Plurality for 
Hijacking his Legacy of Judicial Restraint, 32 QUNNIPIAC L. REV. 352, 383–87 
(2014). 
 176. 504 U.S. at 307. 
 177. 326 U.S. at 311. 
 178. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 (“Building on the seminal case of International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), we have framed the relevant 
inquiry as whether a defendant had minimum contacts with the jurisdiction 
“such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.”) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S.at 316).  See 
also MeadWestvaco, 128 S. Ct. at 1505 (“The Due Process Clause demands that 
there exist some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and 
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax”) (quoting Quill Corp., 504 U.S. 
at 306). 
 179. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311. 
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assistance to newly unemployed state workers.180  The Court’s 
pre-existing rules for due process jurisdiction required that a 
company maintain an in-state presence to be subject to a 
state’s adjudicative jurisdiction.181  The corporation at issue 
had “carefully structured its distribution operations” to avoid 
creating this jurisdiction in the state in question and in other 
states.182  In particular, the corporation limited its contacts 
with the state to certain specific activities conducted by sales 
persons that were, under the law of the day, insufficient to 
establish the required presence necessary for adjudicative 
jurisdiction.183 
Despite the applicable law, the Court in International 
Shoe rejected the corporation’s claim and re-formulated the 
Court’s long-standing jurisdictional rules to preclude the 
corporation’s argument in future cases.  The Court reasoned 
that applying an in-state presence standard to a corporation 
made no sense because corporations, unlike natural persons, 
are not in fact present anywhere.184  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that “[w]hether due process is satisfied must depend 
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation 
to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was 
the purpose of the due process clause to insure.”185 The Court 
re-cast the appropriate due process jurisdiction standard, 
 
 180. Id. at 311–12. 
 181. See id. at 316 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)). 
 182. See Cameron and Johnson, supra note 61, at 803–04.  See also Cameron 
and Johnson, supra note 61, at 799, 799 n.127 (quoting the company’s general 
counsel in 1995: “[International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)] was primarily a tax 
case—we did not want to pay unemployment taxes to the state of Washington.”) 
 183. See Cameron and Johnson, supra note 61 at 803–04.  See also 
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313–14. 
 184. The Court stated: 
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted 
upon as though it were a fact, Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 282 U.S. 
24, it is clear that, unlike an individual, its “presence” without, as well as within, 
the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf 
by those who are authorized to act for it.  To say that the corporation is so far 
“present” there as to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes of taxation 
or the maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the 
question to be decided.  For the terms “present” or “presence” are used merely to 
symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts 
will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. Those demands 
may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as 
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require 
the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. 
326 U.S. at 316–17. 
 185. Id. at 319. 
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holding “that a State may authorize its courts to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the 
defendant has certain minimum contacts with [the State] such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”186 
International Shoe articulated what would become the 
Court’s recognized due process dichotomy between specific and 
general jurisdiction.187  Specific jurisdiction obtains where the 
cause of action “arises out of or relates to the” the defendant’s 
activity in the state.188  General jurisdiction obtains where a 
defendant’s “continuous corporate operations within a state 
[are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit 
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from those activities.”189 General jurisdiction cases, 
unlike specific jurisdiction cases, allow a plaintiff to sue the 
defendant corporation in a forum as to any act of the 
defendant, wherever undertaken, on the theory that the 
corporation is either incorporated in, domiciled in, or otherwise 
“at home” in that forum.190 
B. General Jurisdiction Due Process Cases 
General jurisdiction cases are less common than specific 
jurisdiction cases.191  There have been four decisions since 
International Shoe where the Court has considered whether an 
out-of-state corporate defendant’s in-state contacts were 
sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to justify the exercise 
of general jurisdiction over claims unrelated to those 
 
 186. Id. at 316 (internal quotes omitted).  There was no Commerce Clause 
issue in International Shoe because Congress had authorized state collection of 
the taxes at issue.  See id. at 315. 
 187. The Court later defined the concepts based on logic set forth by Professors 
Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman.  See John N. Drobak, Personal 
Jurisdiction in a Global World: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Decisions in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1707, 1711–12  (2012). 
 188. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (quotes omitted). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 760–61. See Donald Earl Childress, General Jurisdiction and the 
Transnational Law Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67, 70 (2013) (“The Court has 
imposed these heightened requirements for the exercise of general jurisdiction 
because a state may legitimately exercise adjudicative power over a defendant’s 
worldwide conduct only when the defendant is so closely connected to the forum 
state as to be analogous to a citizen or resident.”). 
 191. See Daimler, 134 U.S. at 755 (“Since International Shoe[, 326 U.S. 310 
(1945)]  ‘specific jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of modern jurisdiction 
theory, while general jurisdiction [has played] a reduced role.’ ” ) (quoting 
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct., at 2854). 
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contacts.192 
In Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,193 the Court held 
that general jurisdiction was appropriately exercised over a 
Philippine corporation sued in Ohio, where the company’s 
affairs were overseen during World War II.194  In contrast, in 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,195 the Court 
held that general jurisdiction did not apply.196  In Helicopteros, 
a helicopter owned by a Colombian corporation crashed in Peru 
and survivors of U.S. citizens who died in the crash were 
barred from maintaining wrongful-death actions against the 
Colombian corporation in Texas based on the corporation’s 
helicopter purchases and purchase-linked activity in Texas.197 
More recently, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA 
v. Brown,198 the Court concluded that there was no general 
jurisdiction where North Carolina parents of two boys killed in 
a bus accident that occurred outside Paris brought a wrongful-
death suit in North Carolina state court alleging that the bus’s 
tires were defectively manufactured.199  The complaint named 
as defendants not only The Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company (Goodyear), an Ohio corporation, but also Goodyear’s 
Turkish, French, and Luxembourgian subsidiaries.200  The 
 
 192. Goodyear states that there were “only two [such] decisions postdating 
International Shoe, [326 U. S. 310 (1945)],” 564 U.S. at 2854, but Goodyear itself 
and the 2014 case, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), make four. 
 193. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 194. Id at 447–48.  Benguet had ceased its mining operations during the 
Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War II; its president moved to 
Ohio, where he kept an office, maintained the company’s files, and oversaw the 
company’s activities. Id. The plaintiff, an Ohio resident, sued Benguet on a claim 
that neither arose in Ohio nor related to the corporation’s activities in that State. 
Id. at 431.  The Court held that the Ohio courts could exercise general jurisdiction 
over Benguet without offending due process because, as noted in the Supreme 
Court’s later case, Daimler, “Ohio was the corporation’s principal, if temporary, 
place of business.”  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 756 (quotes omitted). 
 195. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 196. Id. at 408. 
 197. Id. at 415–16.  That company’s contacts with Texas were confined to 
“sending its chief executive officer to Houston for contract-negotiation sessions; 
accepting into its New York bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank; 
purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training services from [a Texas-based 
helicopter company] for substantial sums; and sending personnel to [Texas] for 
training.”  Id. at 416. 
 198. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 199. Id. at 2851. 
 200. Id. at 2850.  The Court posed the question as “Are foreign subsidiaries of 
a United States parent corporation amenable to suit in state court on claims 
unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum State?”  Id. 
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Court noted that the foreign subsidiaries, which manufactured 
tires for sale in Europe and Asia, lacked any affiliation with 
North Carolina.201  Therefore, because Goodyear’s three foreign 
subsidiaries were “in no sense at home in North Carolina,” the 
Court concluded that those subsidiaries could not be required 
to submit to the general jurisdiction of that state’s courts.202 
In 2014, in Daimler AG v. Bauman,203 the Court evaluated 
a fourth general jurisdiction claim pertaining to a foreign 
corporation.204 Daimler also represented the third time that 
the Court evaluated such a claim pertaining to injuries 
sustained as the result of alleged tortuous action.205  In 
Daimler, the respondents were residents of Argentina who 
filed suit in California, naming as a defendant a German public 
stock company (Daimler) that was the parent corporation of an 
Argentinean subsidiary alleged to have collaborated with state 
security forces in Argentina to harm certain workers of the 
subsidiary.206  A claim for general personal jurisdiction over 
Daimler was predicated on the California contacts of another 
subsidiary of the parent, one incorporated in Delaware with its 
principal place of business in New Jersey.207  That second 
subsidiary distributed Daimler-manufactured vehicles to 
independent dealerships throughout the United States, 
including California.208 
 
 201. Id. at 2851. 
 202. Id. at 2857.  A small percentage of tires manufactured by the foreign 
subsidiaries were distributed in North Carolina, which prompted the North 
Carolina Supreme Court to permit general jurisdiction on the theory that the 
subsidiaries had placed these tires into a “stream of commerce.”  131 S. Ct. at 
2851.  The Court responded that “[a]lthough the placement of a product into the 
stream of commerce “may bolster an affiliation germane to specific 
jurisdiction, . . .” such contacts “do not warrant a determination that, based on 
those ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.”  Id. at 2855.  In 
its briefs, the plaintiff made a belated claim that the Court should allow general 
jurisdiction on the theory that the subsidiaries were engaged in a unitary 
business with the parent, but, given the lateness of this claim, the Court refused 
to evaluate it.  Id. at 2857.  See infra note 408 and accompanying text. 
 203. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 204.  Each of the Court’s three prior general jurisdiction cases pertained to a 
foreign corporation.  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. Brown, 131 S. 
Ct. 2846 (2011), Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 
(1984) and Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. 42 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 205. The prior such cases were Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).  See supra notes 195–202 and accompanying text. 
 206. 134 S. Ct. at 750–51. 
 207. Id. at 751. 
 208. Id. 
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The Court in Daimler concluded that Daimler was not 
amenable to suit in California for injuries allegedly caused by 
conduct of its Argentinean subsidiary that took place entirely 
outside the United States.209  In reaching its conclusion, the 
Court questioned whether the activities of Daimler’s Ohio 
subsidiary could be imputed to Daimler, but noted that in any 
event neither Daimler nor its Ohio subsidiary was 
incorporated in California or had its principal place of business 
there, as would be required for purposes of establishing 
general jurisdiction.210 
The theory that supports general jurisdiction resembles 
that which permits a state to tax all of the income of the state’s 
residents irrespective of where their income is earned.211  
However, most cases that pertain to a state’s ability to tax a 
multistate business do not raise questions of whether the 
corporation may be subject to tax on this basis.  Rather, most 
state tax cases raise questions about whether a state can 
impose tax on income or sales that are derived from within the 
state.  Consequently, most state tax cases are specific 
jurisdiction cases.212 
C. Specific Jurisdiction Due Process Cases 
Subsequent to International Shoe, there were several 
important specific jurisdiction cases relating to state tax 
 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 760–62.  The Court also noted concerns about international comity.  
Id. at 762–63. 
 211. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 463 
(1995) (a State “may tax all the income its residents, even income earned outside 
the taxing jurisdiction”); McCullough v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316, 428–29 (noting 
the States’ “power of taxing [their] people and their property to the utmost extent” 
and finding it “almost . . . self-evident” that “[a]ll subjects over which the 
sovereign power of a State extends, are objects of taxation.”).  See also Lea 
Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 Yale L.J. 1277, 1307 (1989) 
(“Since non-domiciliaries lack the opportunity to participate in electoral 
processes, some sort of purposeful action towards the territory by the individual 
is necessary to justify the exertion of state authority.  Absent such a volitional 
act, there would be no way at all to influence the legal norms that governed one’s 
behavior.”).  But see Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1798-2000 (2015) 
(noting that the application of this tax doctrine is subject to the stricture that a 
state may not discriminate against interstate commerce). 
 212. See Rick Handel, A Conceptual Analysis of Nexus in State and Local 
Taxation, 67 TAX LAWYER 623, 635 (2014); Helen Hecht, Is There a Due Process 
Cloud on the Sales and Use Tax Horizon?, 24 J. MULTISTATE TAX 6, 14 (2014). See 
also Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 237 Cal. App. 4th 193, 217 
(2015). 
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collection, leading up to Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.213  In the 
1960 case, Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,214 the Court extended the 
logic in International Shoe to state sales taxes, finding that an 
out-of-state corporation was subject to a state’s use tax 
collection duty based on in-state sales solicitation activities of 
the company’s non-employee representatives.215  Specifically, 
the Court concluded that there was, as required, “some definite 
link, some minimum connection, between a state and the 
person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.”216  The Court 
noted that although the sales representatives were 
contractually termed as being “independent contractors”217 and 
not “employees,” “such a fine distinction is without 
constitutional significance” since “[t]he formal shift in the 
contractual tagging of the salesman as “independent” neither 
results in changing his local function of solicitation nor bears 
upon its effectiveness in securing a substantial flow of goods 
into [the state].”218  The Court further concluded that “[t]o 
permit such formal ‘contractual shifts’ to make a constitutional 
difference would open the gates to a stampede of tax 
avoidance.”219 
In the 1970 case, National Geographic Society v. 
California Bd. of Equalization,220 the appellant (the “Society”), 
 
 213. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 214. 362 U.S. 207 (1960). 
 215. Id. at 210–11 (noting, inter alia, that the ““salesmen” were “not regular 
employees of appellant devoting full time to its service” and that these persons 
worked for “several principals”). 
 216. Id. at 211 (internal quotes omitted).  The Court stated also, echoing 
International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945), that “[t]he test is simply the 
nature and extent of the activities of the appellant in [the state].”  Id. at 211–12. 
 217. The contract specifically provided that it is the intention of the parties “to 
create the relationship . . . of independent contractor.”  Id. at 209. 
 218. Id. at 211. 
 219. Id.  See Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 
483 U.S. 232, 250 (1987) (agreeing with this logic in Scripto). Similar concerns 
about inadvertently fostering tax planning also informed the Court’s decision in 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), see supra notes 179–
86 and accompanying text, and have informed the Court’s decisions with respect 
to the “unitary business principle” as applied as an apportionment method in the 
context of state corporate income tax cases.  See Container Corp. of America v. 
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164–65 (1983) (critiquing a different 
methodology, “formal geographical or transactional accounting,” as a way of 
attributing corporate income to a state because one “problem with this method is 
that formal accounting is subject to manipulation.”).  See also Complete Auto, 430 
U.S. at 281 (expressing disdain for judicial rules evaluating state taxes that posit 
form over substance). 
 220. 430 U.S. 551 (1977). 
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a nonprofit corporation with headquarters in the District of 
Columbia, maintained two offices in California that solicited 
advertising for the Society’s magazine.221 These offices 
performed no activities that were directly related to the 
Society’s mail-order business through which the Society sold 
maps, atlases, globes, and books from its headquarters.222  The 
Society challenged California’s attempt to apply its use tax 
collection duty to its in-state mail order sales on due process 
grounds.223  The Court held that California’s imposition of the 
use-tax-collection liability on the Society’s mail-order 
operation did not violate the Due Process Clause since the 
Society’s continuous presence in California in the two offices 
provided a sufficient nexus between the Society and the state 
to justify imposition of the use tax collection duty.224 The Court 
concluded that it was immaterial that there was no direct 
relationship between the Society’s sales activity in California 
and the two advertising offices located there because the issue 
was “simply whether the facts demonstrate some definite link, 
some minimum connection, between [the State and] the 
person . . . it seeks to tax.”225 
The 1985 case, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,226 is not a 
state tax case, but is nonetheless important to the state tax 
analysis, in part because the case was later relied upon by 
Quill.227  In Burger King, the Court concluded that a franchisor 
headquartered in Florida could maintain a breach-of-contract 
action in Florida against Michigan franchisees that had no 
physical ties to Florida, since the parties’ agreement 
contemplated, and in fact resulted in, on-going mail and 
telephone interactions between the franchisees and the 
franchisor’s headquarters.228  The Court noted that its decision 
was warranted given, among other things, that the owner of 
the franchisees was an “experienced and sophisticated” 
 
 221. Id. at 552. 
 222. Id.  Orders for the Society’s sales items were mailed from California 
directly to appellant’s headquarters on coupons or forms enclosed with 
announcements previously mailed to Society members and magazine subscribers 
or on order forms contained in the magazine.  Id. 
 223. Id. at 554. 
 224. Id. at 560–62. 
 225. 430 U.S. at 561 (internal quotes omitted). 
 226. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 227. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307–08. 
 228. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480–81, 487. 
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businessman who did not act under economic duress,229 and 
that the franchise contract reasonably should have suggested 
to the franchisee that lawsuits under such contract could be 
filed against him in Florida.230 
In 1992, Quill determined that a mail order vendor not 
otherwise present in the state was subject to due process 
jurisdiction when it mailed a large volume of catalogs into the 
state and used common carriers to deliver its considerable 
products sold there.231  International Shoe had previously held 
that an in-state corporate presence is not required for 
adjudicative jurisdiction and Quill relied upon International 
Shoe and Burger King to conclude that physical presence is 
also not required as a matter of due process for state tax 
jurisdiction.232  In so holding, Quill formally overruled the 
Court’s prior contrary holding in National Bellas Hess.233  The 
Court noted that under its current jurisprudence “notice” or 
“fair warning” is the analytic “touchstone of due process nexus 
analysis.”234  It concluded that “[s]o long as a commercial 
actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of 
another State”—for example, through “continuous and 
widespreadsolicitation of business within a State”-–such actor 
“clearly has fair warning that its activity may subject it to the 
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”235 
D. Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of 
Calif.236 
For the past several decades the Court’s application of the 
minimum contacts analysis set forth in International Shoe has 
relied significantly on Asahi Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior 
 
 229. Id. at 484–85. 
 230. Id. at 481–82. 
 231. Quill, 504 U.S. at 306–08. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 308 (“Thus, to the extent that our decisions have indicated that the 
Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a State for the imposition of 
duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings as superseded by 
developments in the law of due process.”).  In contrast, the case retained the 
physical presence standard for Commerce Clause purposes so the company in 
question was not required to pay retroactive use taxes.  See supra notes 88–98 
and accompanying text. 
 234. Id. at 312. 
 235. Id. at 308 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 
(1985) and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 236. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
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Court of Calif.237 Asahi was a plurality decision that splintered 
4-4 as to the practical application of this test.238 
In Asahi, a Taiwanese motorcycle manufacturer sought 
jurisdiction in California over a Japanese company that 
manufactured motorcycle parts in Japan that were alleged to 
be the proximate cause of a motorcycle accident that took place 
in California.239  The Japanese company sold its parts into the 
stream of commerce and was aware that tires incorporating its 
parts would be sold in California.240  However, the company did 
not: (1) do business in California; (2) have an office, agents, 
employees, or property in California; or (3) advertise or solicit 
business in California.241  The company also did not create, 
control, or employ the distribution system that brought its 
assemblies to, or design these assemblies in anticipation of 
sales in, California.242 
Justice Brennan, writing for four Justices, concluded that 
as long as a party is aware that its product is being marketed 
in the forum state, jurisdiction premised on the placement of 
the product into the stream of commerce is consistent with the 
Due Process Clause, and no showing of additional conduct is 
required.243  He further concluded that even though the 
petitioner did not design or control the distribution system that 
carried its assemblies into California, the fact that it made 
regular and extensive sales to a manufacturer that it knew was 
making regular sales of the final product in California was 
sufficient to establish minimum contacts jurisdiction.244  
Applying this standard, Justice Brennan would have found the 
existence of jurisdiction if not for the existence of special 
factual circumstances.245 
Justice O’Connor, also writing for four Justices, differed 
with Justice Brennan.  She concluded that the “substantial 
connection” between a defendant and the forum state 
necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must derive from 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. See id. 
 239. Id. at 105–06. 
 240. Id. at 106–07. 
 241. Id. at 112–13 
 242. 480 U.S. at 112–13. 
 243. Id. at 116–17, 121 (Brennan, J.). 
 244. Id. at 121 
 245. Id. at 116–17, 121.  The special factual circumstances are discussed infra 
notes 249–254 and accompanying text. 
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an action purposely directed toward the forum state.246  Also, 
she concluded that the mere placement of a product into the 
stream of commerce is not such an act, even if done with 
awareness that the stream will sweep the product into the 
forum state—absent additional conduct indicating an intent to 
serve the forum state market.247  Those additional acts could 
include, for example, designing the product for the market in 
the forum state, advertising in the forum state, establishing 
channels for providing regular advice to customers in the 
forum state, or marketing the product through a distributor 
who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum state.248 
Despite the disagreement on the minimum contacts 
analysis, all nine Justices that took part in Asahi agreed that 
jurisdiction was not appropriate on the facts. 249  The holding 
was based on the Justices’ conclusion that, given the unusual 
facts, it would not have been fair and reasonable for 
jurisdiction to apply.250  In making this determination the 
Court considered the burden on the defendant, the interests of 
the forum State, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 
relief.251  It also weighed in its determination “the interstate 
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the 
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social 
policies.”252  In general, the outcome of the reasonableness 
analysis turned on the facts that: (1) the action was one for 
indemnification, not a case with respect to the underlying 
California accident; (2) the transaction on which the claim was 
based took place in Taiwan; and (3) both parties were foreign 
 
 246. Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J.). 
 247. Id. at 112–13 (O’Connor, J.).  See id. at 108 (noting the fact that “Asahi 
did not design or control the system of distribution that carried its valve 
assemblies into California”). 
 248. 480 U.S. at 112.  See also id. (“[A] defendant’s awareness that the stream 
of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert 
the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully 
directed toward the forum State.”). 
 249. See generally 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  Justice Stevens did not join the 
minimum contacts analysis of either Justice Brennan or Justice O’Connor 
because he did not think it was necessary for the disposition of the case. Id. at 
121–22 (Stevens, J.). 
 250. Id. at 113–16, 121–22 (eight of the nine Justices—all but Justice Scalia—
agreed with this analysis).  Compare International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (stating that jurisdiction must not offend “traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice”). 
 251. 480 U.S. at 113. 
 252. Id. 
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nationals.253  Consequently, the interest of California in 
hearing the case was slight, and there was a need to consider 
the procedural and substantive policies of other nations.254 
E. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro255 
After Asahi, the courts split on the appropriate minimum 
contacts theory to apply, with some courts applying Justice 
Brennan’s stream of commerce theory and other courts 
applying Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce-plus 
theory.256  Almost thirty-five years later the Supreme Court 
revisited Asahi in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.257  
The Court’s decision in McIntyre was intended, in part, to 
resolve the confusion created by Asahi.258  However, McIntyre 
only increased the confusion—and created considerable 
controversy.259  Whereas Asahi resulted in a 4-4 stalemate on 
the minimum contacts question,260 McIntyre broke 4-2-3.261 
1. The Decision 
In McIntyre, the cause of action was—as in Asahi—
predicated on an accident allegedly caused by a foreign 
manufacturer’s defective product.262  Jurisdiction was sought 
 
 253. Id. at 114–16. 
 254. Id.  The Court stated that “Great care and reserve should be exercised 
when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.”  
Id. at 115 (quotes omitted). 
 255. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 256. Id. at 2789 (“Since Asahi was decided, the courts have sought to reconcile 
the competing opinions”).  See also Adam N. Steinman, The Meaning of McIntyre, 
18 Sw. J. Int’l 417, 418 (noting the “post-Asahi uncertainty”); Robin J. Effron, 
Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness Problem in 
Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW 867, 879–80 (2012) 
(discussing the post-Asahi disagreements in the lower federal courts). 
 257. See generally 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 258. Id. at 2785 (stating an intent to address the “decades-old questions left 
open by Asahi” in jurisdictional cases pertaining to an “absent party”) (Kennedy, 
J.). 
 259.  McIntyre has been heavily criticized by commentators both for its holding 
and the fact that it produced no clear single opinion.  See e.g., Effron, supra note 
256, at 868, 868 n.3 (citing articles); Drobak, supra note 187, at 1729; Steinman, 
supra note 256, at 425–26; John T. Parry, Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities 
of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 827, 851–52 (2012). 
 260. See supra notes 243–48 and accompanying text. 
 261. See generally McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 262. Compare McIntyre, 31 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) with Asahi, 480 U.S. 102, 
105–06 (1987).  The recent 2011 case, Goodyear, involved a similar allegation.  
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850.  See also Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750–51 (2014) (pertaining 
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in a court in New Jersey—the site of the accident—based on 
three primary facts.263  First, a U.S. distributor agreed to sell 
the defendant’s machines in the United States.264  Second, 
officials of the defendant attended trade shows in several 
states, though not in New Jersey.265  Third, no more than four 
of the defendant’s machines, including the one at issue, ended 
up in New Jersey.266  The New Jersey Supreme Court held that 
New Jersey’s courts could exercise jurisdiction over a foreign 
manufacturer without contravening the Due Process Clause so 
long as the manufacturer knew or reasonably should have 
known that its products were distributed through a nationwide 
distribution system that might lead to sales in any of the 
states.267  The New Jersey court invoked Justice Brennan’s 
“stream-of-commerce” test from Asahi to find such jurisdiction, 
even though at no time had the manufacturer advertised in, 
sent goods to, or in any relevant sense targeted the state.268 
a. Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
The Supreme Court reversed, in a splintered decision that 
produced minimal analytic consensus.  Justice Kennedy, 
writing for four Justices, agreed with the Court’s prior 
precedent that the appropriate standard was whether the 
defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
 
to a jurisdiction claim based on a foreign corporation’s allegedly tortuous 
conduct). 
 263. 31 S. Ct. at 2786, 2790–91. 
 264. Id.  The distributor had a similar name as the manufacturer but “the two 
companies were separate and independent entities with no commonality of 
ownership or management.”  Id. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quotations 
omitted).  There was “no allegation that the distributor was under [the 
manufacturer’s] control.”  Id. at 2786.  The distributor “structured [its] 
advertising and sales efforts in accordance with”the manufacturer’s” direction 
and guidance whenever possible” and “at least some of the machines were sold on 
consignment to” the distributor.  Id. (square brackets in original). 
 265. Id. at 2786, 2790–91.  See also id. at 2795–96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 266. Id. at 2786, 2790.  The machine that injured the plaintiff was purchased 
as a result of a demonstration made to the plaintiff’s employer at a Nevada trade 
show.  See 31 S. Ct. at 2795–96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The employer later 
purchased the machine from McIntyre’s American distributor, based in Ohio, 
with a check payable to that distributor.  See Nicastro v. McIntyre Machinery 
America, 987 A.2d 575, 578 (N.J. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct 2780 (2011).  There were 
no conclusive facts as to any other sales made to New Jersey customers.  J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2795 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 267. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786. 
 268. Id. (At “no time [had the manufacturer] either marketed goods in the 
State or shipped them there.”). 
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conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws.”269  He concluded, however, 
that this standard was not met because the defendant never 
engaged in any activities in New Jersey that revealed an 
intention to invoke or benefit from the protection of the state’s 
laws.270  He noted the fact that the company had no office in 
New Jersey; neither paid taxes nor owned property there; and 
neither advertised in, nor sent any employees to, the State.271  
Indeed, he pointed out, the trial court found that the petitioner 
did not have a single contact with New Jersey  apart from the 
fact that the machine in question ended up there.272  He 
concluded that the facts of the case “may reveal an intent to 
serve the U.S. market, but they do not show that [the 
defendant] purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey 
market.”273 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged the confusion caused by 
the competing plurality opinions in Asahi.274  He rejected 
Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce” test because in his 
view it is “the defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that 
empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment.”275  He 
stated that a defendant’s placement of goods into commerce 
“with the expectation that they will be purchased by 
consumers within the forum State” might indicate purposeful 
availment,276 but that more was required – “the principal 
inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the defendant’s 
activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a 
sovereign.”277 
Justice Kennedy’s injection of the sovereignty analysis 
into the purposeful availment test was novel.278  He stated two 
 
 269. Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J.) (quotes omitted). 
 270. Id. at 2791. 
 271. Id. at 2790. 
 272. Id. 
 273. 131 S. Ct. at 2790. 
 274. Id. at 2789 (“Since Asahi was decided, the courts have sought to reconcile 
the competing opinions.”). 
 275. Id. at 2788. 
 276. Id. (stating also that “a defendant may in an appropriate case be subject 
to jurisdiction without entering the forum . . . as where manufacturers or 
distributors seek to serve a given State’s market.”). 
 277. Id. (“In other words, the defendant must “purposefully avai[l] itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws.”) 
 278. See id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“the constitutional limits on a 
state court’s adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due process, not 
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principles that were implicit in his reasoning.  First, personal 
jurisdiction “requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-
sovereign, analysis.”279  He stated that “[t]he question is 
whether a defendant has followed a course of conduct directed 
at the society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a 
given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject 
the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.”280  Justice 
Kennedy’s second principle was a corollary of the first: 
“[b]ecause the United States is a distinct sovereign, a 
defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States but not of any particular State.”281  
However, he noted that the latter possibility “would be an 
exceptional case”—in part because “foreign corporations will 
often target or concentrate on particular States, subjecting 
them to specific jurisdiction in those forums.”282 
Justice Kennedy suggested that his jurisdictional concerns 
were primarily with respect to foreign defendants—a fact also 
at issue in Asahi,283 and in the more recent general jurisdiction 
cases, Goodyear284 and Daimler.285  In McIntyre, the foreign 
corporation was one that had not targeted the markets of any 
particular state or states, but rather the United States in 
general.286  Also, Justice Kennedy’s second sovereignty 
principle—pertaining to whether federal due process 
jurisdiction might apply where no state court jurisdiction 
would—presumably would arise primarily with respect to 
foreign defendants.287  In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg 
 
state sovereignty”); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 204 n.20 (1977) 
(recognizing that “the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States [is not] the 
central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction”). 
 279. 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J). 
 280. Id. (stating also that “Personal jurisdiction, of course, restricts ‘judicial 
power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty,’ for 
due process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to lawful power.  But 
whether a judicial judgment is lawful depends on whether the sovereign has 
authority to render it.”) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites 
de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 2789–90. 
 283. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 284. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 285. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 286. 131 S. Ct. at 2790. 
 287. Id. (Kennedy, J.) (“For jurisdiction, a litigant may have the requisite 
relationship with the United States Government but not with the government of 
any individual State. That would be an exceptional case, however. If the 
defendant is a domestic domiciliary, the courts of its home State are available 
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repeatedly referenced Justice Kennedy’s analysis as being with 
respect to foreign defendants.288 
However, Justice Kennedy also made clear that his 
general analysis potentially applied in situations where the 
defendant was a U.S. producer.  He stated that: 
It must be remembered, however, that although this case 
and Asahi both involve foreign manufacturers, the 
undesirable consequences of Justice Brennan’s approach 
are no less significant for domestic producers. The owner of 
a small Florida farm might sell crops to a large nearby 
distributor, for example, who might then distribute them to 
grocers across the country. If foreseeability were the 
controlling criterion, the farmer could be sued in Alaska or 
any number of other States’ courts without ever leaving 
town.289 
Justice Kennedy conceded that sometimes a defendant 
might meet his construction of the purposeful availment test 
“by sending [into the state] its goods rather than its agents.”290 
But in those cases, “the defendant’s transmission of goods 
permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant 
can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is 
not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its 
goods will reach the forum State.”291  Consequently, Justice 
Kennedy aligned himself with Justice O’Connor’s “stream-of-
commerce-plus” theory—a point that he admitted.292  But he 
also stated that this theory would not by itself resolve many 
difficult questions of jurisdiction that will arise in particular 
cases.293 
 
and can exercise general jurisdiction”). 
 288. See, e.g., id. at 2799 (Ginsburg J., dissenting) (“This case is illustrative of 
marketing arrangements for sales in the United States common in today’s 
commercial world. A foreign-country manufacturer engages a U. S. company to 
promote and distribute the manufacturer’s products, not in any particular State, 
but anywhere and everywhere in the United States the distributor can attract 
purchasers.”) (emphasis added); id. at 2802 (stating that “this Court has not 
considered in any prior case the now-prevalent pattern presented here—a 
foreign-country manufacturer enlisting a U.S. distributor to develop a market in 
the United States for the manufacturer’s products.”) (emphasis added).  Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent is discussed in more detail infra notes 308–13 and 
accompanying text. 
 289. Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J.). 
 290. Id. at 2788. 
 291. 131 S. Ct. at 2788. 
 292. Id. at 2790 (“the authority to subject a defendant to judgment depends on 
purposeful availment, consistent with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi.”). 
 293. Id. (stating also that “[t]he defendant’s conduct and the economic realities 
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Justice Kennedy did not apply the separate fairness test 
that resolved the question of jurisdiction with respect to the 
foreign defendant in Asahi—perhaps because he considered 
this test to be subsumed within his more general sovereignty 
analysis.294  Alternatively, the omission may have been 
because the fairness test was not necessary on the facts, given 
that the minimum contacts test was not satisfied.295 
b. Justice Breyer’s opinion 
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice Alito, 
agreed with Justice Kennedy as to the disposition of the case, 
but did not agree with the analysis.296  Further, he was not 
willing “to announce a rule of broad applicability without fully 
considering modern-day consequences.”297  Justice Breyer 
concluded that the disposition of the case was dictated by the 
Court’s prior “precedents,”298 and noted that the facts did not 
meet either Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce test or 
Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce-plus theory.299  In 
 
of the market the defendant seeks to serve will differ across cases, and judicial 
exposition will, in common-law fashion, clarify the contours of that principle.”) 
 294. See id. at 2787 (“Freeform notions of fundamental fairness divorced from 
traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered in the absence of 
authority into law.”).  See Parry, supra note 259, at 844 (arguing that Justice 
Kennedy’s statement that a small domestic farmer would be protected from 
burdensome litigation in another state by reason of his analysis “suggests that 
[for him] there is no fairness inquiry at all.”); Noyes, supra note 175, at 44 (stating 
that Justice Kennedy “would eliminate the fairness requirement as redundant”). 
 295. See Steinman, supra note 256, at 430 (“[I]t would be wrong to read 
McIntyre as inferring that second step in the jurisdictional framework.  As a 
logical matter, there was no need for either Justice Kennedy or Breyer to confront 
the reasonableness or fairness factors.  They have each concluded that McIntyre 
had not purposefully established minimum contacts with New Jersey, which is 
the first requirement of the traditional test.”). 
 296. 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]hough I agree with the 
plurality as to the outcome of this case, I concur only in the judgment of that 
opinion and not its reasoning.”). 
 297. Id. at 2791.  His rationale was based on the fact that “the case did not 
present issues arising from recent changes in commerce and communication.”  Id. 
 298. Id.  But see Drobak, supra note 187, at 1735–36 (“Perhaps the most 
unusual aspect of the opinions in Nicastro is the claim by the concurrence that 
they are doing no more than adhering to . . . precedents.”). 
 299. 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Although Justice Breyer 
disagreed with the “stream of commerce” approach applied by the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, he suggested that his difficulty was not with the test but the way 
the court applied the test.  See id. (stating that under the New Jersey court’s view, 
“a producer is subject to jurisdiction for a products-liability action so long as it 
knows or reasonably should know ‘that its products are distributed through a 
nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products being sold in 
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particular, he stated that “the relevant facts show no 
‘regular . . . flow’ or ‘regular course’ of sales in New Jersey, and 
there is no ‘something more,’ such as special state-related 
design, advertising, advice, or marketing, that would warrant 
the assertion of jurisdiction.”300 
Justice Breyer also noted that the plaintiff “has shown no 
specific effort by the British Manufacturer to sell in New 
Jersey” and “has not otherwise shown that the British 
Manufacturer purposefully availed itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within New Jersey, or that it delivered its 
goods in the stream of commerce with the expectation that they 
will be purchased by New Jersey users.”301  Among other 
things, “[h]e has introduced no list of potential New Jersey 
customers who might, for example, have regularly attended 
trade shows.”302 
Justice Breyer emphasized that what was key to his 
determination was that “none of the Court’s precedents finds 
that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of 
sales effort indicated here, is sufficient.”303  Unlike Justice 
Kennedy, Justice Breyer also applied a fairness inquiry similar 
to that applied in Asahi.304  He concluded that a finding of 
jurisdiction would not be fair given the manufacturer’s limited 
contacts.305  Justice Breyer suggested that fairness might 
 
any of the fifty states.’ ” ) (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Machinery America, 987 
A.2d 575, 592 (N.J. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct 2780 (2011)) (emphasis in original). 
 300. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (generally quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. 102 
(1997)). 
 301.  Id. (quotations omitted). 
 302. Id.  Justice Breyer made reference to the more extensive analysis of the 
facts set forth in the dissent.  Id.  He stated that “[t]here may well have been 
other facts that Mr. Nicastro could have demonstrated in support of jurisdiction. 
And the dissent considers some of those facts . . . But the plaintiff bears the 
burden of establishing jurisdiction, and here I would take the facts precisely as 
the New Jersey Supreme Court stated them.”  Id.  Compare id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, 
J. dissenting) (“How could McIntyre UK not have intended, by its actions 
targeting a national market, to sell products in the fourth largest destination for 
imports among all States of the United States and the largest scrap metal 
market?”). 
 303. Id. at 2792.  But see Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum 
Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 G. WASH. L. REV. 204, 227–28 (arguing 
that Justice Breyer’s one-sale conclusion with respect to prior Supreme Court 
cases is incorrect); Drobak, supra note 187, at 1734–36 (similar).  See infra note 
336 and accompanying text (discussing commentary and cases that suggest that 
one in-state sale might be sufficient to establish due process jurisdiction in some 
instances). 
 304. 131 S. Ct at 2793.  Compare Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–16. 
 305. 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that he could not 
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dictate that a large domestic manufacturer using a large 
distributor should be subject to a state’s jurisdiction given its 
in-state sales, whereas similar facts would not be sufficient 
with respect to a small-sized manufacturer.306  He also stated—
consistent with the holding in Asahi—that the requisite 
fairness necessary for due process jurisdiction is less likely to 
exist where the defendant corporation is foreign.307 
c. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent on behalf of three justices 
concluded that there was due process jurisdiction.308  She 
reasoned that the defendant had utilized its independent but 
exclusive distributor to target the national U.S. market, 
including New Jersey.309  By using the distributor to promote 
and sell its machines in the United States, she concluded that 
the defendant had “purposefully availed itself” of the United 
States market nationwide, not a market in a single State or a 
discrete collection of States.310  Therefore, the defendant had 
availed itself of the market of all States in which its products 
were sold by its exclusive distributor and could be subject to 
adjudicative jurisdiction on that basis.311  She concluded that 
it would undermine principles of fundamental fairness to 
insulate the foreign manufacturer from accountability in court 
at the place within the United States where its products caused 
injury.312   
Justice Ginsburg also disagreed with Justice Kennedy’s 
 
“reconcile” the New Jersey court’s approach with “defendant-focused fairness.”) 
 306. Id.  He stated that “a rule like the New Jersey Supreme Court’s would 
permit every State to assert jurisdiction in a products-liability suit against any 
domestic manufacturer who sells its products (made anywhere in the United 
States) to a national distributor, no matter how large or small the manufacturer, 
no matter how distant the forum, and no matter how few the number of items 
that end up in the particular forum at issue.”  Id. 
 307. Id. at 2793–94 (“[T]he fact that the defendant is a foreign, rather than a 
domestic, manufacturer makes the basic fairness of an absolute rule yet more 
uncertain.”).  He stated also that “[i]t may be fundamentally unfair to require a 
small Egyptian shirt maker, a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan 
coffee farmer, selling its products through international distributors, to respond 
to products-liability tort suits in virtually every State in the United States, even 
those in respect to which the foreign firm has no connection at all but the sale of 
a single (allegedly defective) good.”  Compare Asahi, 480 U.S. 102, 113–16 (1987). 
 308. 131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 309. Id. at 2801. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 2800–01. 
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emphasis on sovereignty.  She concluded, “the constitutional 
limits on a state court’s adjudicatory authority derive from 
considerations of due process, not state sovereignty.313 
2. Analysis 
Commentators have criticized McIntyre for seeking to 
resolve the confusion created by Asahi in the adjudicative 
jurisdiction context and instead creating more confusion.314  
However, it is clear that McIntyre should not impact the due 
process jurisdiction analysis applied in state tax cases. 
No one opinion in McIntyre was supported by a majority of 
the Justices.315  Under the rule in U.S. v. Marks,316 if the 
Justices are split as to the rationale for a judgment, with less 
than five joining in any one opinion, the rule of the case is 
limited to the rationale in which at least five Justices who 
supported the judgment may be said to concur.317  Subsequent 
cases and scholars generally agree that McIntyre’s 
precedential analysis is that stated in the concurring opinion 
of Justice Breyer.318  Justice Breyer expressed allegiance to the 
 
 313. Id. at 2798.   
 314. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 303, at 228 (“not only does McIntyre not 
resolve any of the ambiguities left by Asahi, it adds a host of new problems for 
lower courts and jurisdiction scholars trying to understand the proper scope of 
specific jurisdiction”); Parry, supra note 259, at 841 (“The most straightforward 
observation one can make about Nicastro is that it compounds the [previous] 
uncertainty.”). 
 315. See supra notes 269–318 and accompanying text. 
 316. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 317. Id. at 193 (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices the holding of 
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred 
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .”) (internal quotation omitted)). 
 318. See, e.g., Kaitlyn Findley, Paddling Past Nicastro in the Stream of 
Commerce Doctrine: Interpreting Justice Breyer’s Concurrence as Implicitly 
Inviting Lower Courts to Develop Alternative Jurisdictional Standards, 63 EMORY 
L.J. 695, 723 (2014) (“Justice Breyer’s narrow concurrence in the judgment based 
on existing precedent is the holding of Nicastro and is binding on all lower 
courts.”); Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions 
in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 514 and n.220 
(2012) (“Marks certainly means that Justice Kennedy’s four-Justice plurality 
would not constitute the Supreme Court’s holding in McIntyre.  If any opinion 
qualified under Marks as the one ‘concurring . . . on the narrowest grounds’ it 
would seem to be Justice Breyer’s concurrence”) (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193); 
Robert M. Pollack, “Not of Any Particular State”: J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. 
Nicastro and Nonspecific Purposeful Availment, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1088, 1105 
(2014) (noting that since McIntyre “lower courts have looked to Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence for guidance”). 
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Court’s prior precedents,319 rejected Justice Kennedy’s novel 
focus on sovereignty concerns,320 relied heavily on his 
understanding that only one of the defendant’s products was 
sold in the forum state,321 and suggested that the plaintiff may 
simply have failed to prove the facts necessary for 
jurisdiction.322  Therefore, in general, it may be that McIntyre 
affected very little change to Supreme Court doctrine.323 
a. Practical Limitations of McIntyre for State Tax 
Purposes 
For state tax purposes it is important that McIntyre 
suggested practical limits to its holding, both with respect to 
the type of company and the nature of the activity to which the 
holding could apply.  The facts of McIntyre pertained to a 
foreign manufacturer – a focus that tends to characterize the 
Court’s due process jurisdiction cases324—and each of the 
Justices seemed to conclude that it was with respect to such 
facts that the case reasoning would most likely apply.325  A 
significant assumed fact in McIntyre was that the defendant 
 
 319. 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In my view, the outcome of 
this case is determined by our precedents.”) 
 320. See id. at 2792–93 (stating that the facts of the case are “an unsuitable 
vehicle for making broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional 
rules.”) 
 321. Id. at 2792 (“none of the Court’s precedents finds that a single isolated 
sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient.”) 
 322. See supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
 323. See Noyes, supra note 175, at 60 (concluding that “The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Nicastro does not break much, if any, new ground.”); Findley, supra 
note 318, at 733–34 (quoting one federal district court, similar to other courts, as 
concluding “that Nicastro’s precedential value is limited to cases involving an 
identical fact pattern, ‘otherwise leaving the legal landscape untouched.’ ” ) 
(quoting Windsor v. Spinner Industry, 825 F. Supp. 2d. 632, 638 (D. Md. 2011)); 
Steinman, supra note 256, at 426–27 (noting the propensity of lower courts to 
distinguish McIntyre on the facts and quoting one federal district court as stating 
“At best McIntyre is applicable to cases presenting the same factual scenario that 
it does.”); Pollack, supra note 318, at 1105 (quoting the Federal Circuit Court as 
concluding “that the law remains the same after [Nicastro]”) (quoting AFTG-TG, 
LLC v. Nuvoton Tech Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
 324. See supra notes 204-205, 239 and 262 and accompanying text.  See also 
Katherine J. Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimaging Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 
101 CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1511 (2013) (“Although the basic personal jurisdiction 
framework applied to U.S. and foreign defendants is the same, U.S. courts have 
often shown particular solicitude for foreigners. . . Asahi Metal’s reasonableness 
test . . . is predominantly used in the international context [and the Court’s] . . . 
most recent personal jurisdiction cases, particularly J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. 
v. Nicastro, reaffirm the Court’s special concern for the rights of foreign actors.”). 
 325. See supra notes 283–88 and accompanying text. 
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targeted the market of the United States in sum and not the 
market of any individual state.326  Justice Breyer noted that 
the foreign manufacturer did not even possess a list of 
potential customers in New Jersey—a fact that he considered 
noteworthy.327  In contrast, most manufacturers that do 
business in the United States—certainly businesses of any size 
or ambition—engage in substantial, sophisticated in-state 
marketing activity.328 
The Justices in McIntyre seemed to struggle to identify a 
situation where the reasoning that justified the case holding 
could apply to a domestic manufacturer.329  The plurality and 
the concurring opinions both suggested that the only logical 
analogy is one where the domestic manufacturer is a very 
small, localized business.330  Justice Kennedy gave as an 
example that of “[t]he owner of a small Florida farm [that] 
might sell crops to a large nearby distributor . . . who might 
then distribute them to grocers across the country.”331  Justice 
Breyer gave as his example that of “a small manufacturer (say, 
an Appalachian potter) who sells his product (cups and 
saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who resells a single 
item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State (Hawaii).”332  
Fact patterns such as these pertaining to small, localized 
businesses are not generally of concern to state tax 
administrators given that very little tax revenue will be at 
stake. 
More particularly, the holding in McIntyre was premised 
on the fact that the defendant had made only a single sale with 
respect to the forum state.333  Justice Breyer’s opinion, which 
 
 326. See supra notes 263–66 and accompanying text.  But see supra note 302 
and accompanying text. 
 327. See 131 S. Ct at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the plaintiff has 
“introduced no list of potential New Jersey customers who might, for example, 
have regularly attended trade shows” and referencing this point when saying 
“[t]here may well have been other facts that Mr. Nicastro could have 
demonstrated in support of jurisdiction”). 
 328. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy By Default?, 29 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 61, 64 (2013) (noting that modern businesses “collect reams of data 
about us for marketing, pricing, product development and other uses”). 
 329. Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J), 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 330. Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J). 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 331. Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J.). 
 332. Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 333. See Pollack, supra note 318, at 1106 (“The decisional linchpin of the 
Breyer opinion lies in his finding that ‘[n]one of our precedents finds that a single 
isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is 
sufficient’ contact to justify an exercise of personal jurisdiction.”) (quoting 
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is likely the precedential opinion resulting from McIntyre,334 
emphasized this point.335 Therefore the holding in McIntyre 
likely only applies—either with respect to a foreign or domestic 
entity—in such instances.336  Perhaps this point more than any 
other reveals the limitations of McIntyre as applied to state 
taxation.  It only takes a single product to bring about a serious 
injury and so a single sale can be the basis for the claim of 
adjudicative jurisdiction, as it was in McIntyre.337  But  for 
purposes of corporate income tax or sales tax, state taxation is 
almost always applied to an out-of-state company in instances 
in which the company is either engaged in making significant 
in-state sales or otherwise engaged in significant in-state 
market exploitation.338 
All nine Justices in McIntyre agreed that when a state’s 
market is targeted in the manner suggested by Justice 
O’Connor’s Asahi opinion there would be due process 
jurisdiction.339  This targeting included, by way of example, 
 
McIntyre 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
 334. See supra note 318 and accompanying text. 
 335. 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 336. See supra note 323, citing articles and cases suggesting the case should 
be limited to its facts.  But the case does not necessarily mean that when a 
company makes a single sale into a state there is no potential finding of 
adjudicative jurisdiction. Justice Breyer specifically stated that he would respect 
the Court’s prior “precedents,” 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring), and in 
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., the Court upheld adjudicative jurisdiction in 
California even though the defendant had “never solicited or done any insurance 
business in California apart from the policy involved here.”  335 U.S. 220, 222 
(1957).  See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011) (“Since International Shoe 
[326 U. S. 310 (1945)], this Court’s decisions have elaborated primarily on 
circumstances that warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction, particularly in 
cases involving ‘single or occasional acts’ occurring or having their impact within 
the forum State) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318).  For an analysis 
of how Justice Breyer’s opinion can be reconciled with McGee, see Steinman, 
supra note 256, at 442–43 and n.144.  See also infra notes 421–36 (discussing the 
recent cases decided under The Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (“PACT”) Act 
where, Justice Breyer’s statement in McIntyre notwithstanding, two courts were 
not willing to assume that the Supreme Court’s precedent stands for the 
proposition that there can never be adjudicative jurisdiction when only a single 
sale is made into a state). 
 337. See 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the accident at 
issue was caused by a “single, isolated sale”). 
 338. See, for example, the cases cited at supra notes 106–47.  See also supra 
note 336 (noting that a single sale into a state might be sufficient to establish 
jurisdiction in some cases). 
 339. 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (Kennedy, J.) (noting the “conclusion that the authority 
to subject a defendant to judgment depends on purposeful availment, consistent 
with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi”); 131 S. Ct at 2792 (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (quoting Justice O’Connor’s Asahi decision favorably”); 2802 
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“designing the product for the market in the forum State, 
advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for 
providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or 
marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed 
to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.”340  Some state 
tax practitioners have suggested that these standards can be 
potentially sidestepped by a manufacturer who chooses to sell 
goods through an intermediary.341  However, Justice 
O’Connor’s standards literally apply whether a company’s in-
state targeting is direct or indirect – and McIntyre provides no 
fodder for this argument, as the key relevant point in the case 
was that there was no such proven customer-specific direct or 
indirect in-state targeting.342  Also, in any event, once a 
company that is engaged in selling products into a state makes 
significant sales in that state—irrespective as to the nature of 
the targeting—the logic in McIntyre no longer applies.343 
 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (same).  See also Noyes, supra note 175, at 45. 
 340. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J.).  Justice Breyer specifically 
referenced these standards.  131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J. concurring).  Justice 
Kennedy embraced Justice O’Connor’s general approach, though he said it might 
not work well in difficult cases.  Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J.).  Justice Breyer and 
Justice Kennedy both suggested that in-state advertising would be a sufficient 
contact.  See id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J.), 2792 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
 341. See, e.g., Benton, et al., supra note 11 (stating that, given the analysis in 
McIntyre, “the interposition of an affiliated or independent “middleman” may 
further bolster an argument that an entity is not subject to tax under the due 
process clause, so long as the interposed party is truly responsible for directing 
the business”); Brian J. Kirkell, et al., supra note 11 (“J. McIntyre Machinery has 
infused life into the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution as an effective bar 
to state taxation”); Charloette Noel and Karen H. Currie, One-Step-Removed, or 
‘Economic,’ Nexus: Not All Contacts With States Are Constitutionally Equal, BNA 
WEEKLY STATE TAX REPORT, Sept. 16, 2011 (concluding that McIntyre supports 
the claim that indirect or “one-step-removed” state tax nexus assertions are 
unconstitutional).  Compare McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J.) (asking but 
not answering the question: “does it matter if, instead of shipping the products 
directly, a company consigns the products through an intermediary (say, 
Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the orders?”). 
 342. The foreign defendant in McIntyre made sales through an unrelated 
intermediary, but Justice Breyer suggested that, despite this fact, the plaintiff 
would have prevailed had he shown that the defendant maintained a “list of 
potential New Jersey customers who might . . . have regularly attended [U.S.] 
trade shows.”  Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). In the particular case where a 
state seeks to assert a use tax collection duty, the use of an intermediary by a 
manufacturer likely would not defeat this collection requirement—irrespective as 
to the due process analysis—since, among other things, the obligation to collect 
use tax could merely be transferred to the intermediary.  See Hecht, supra note 
212, at 9. 
 343. See Noyes, supra note 175, at 45, 60–62 (stating that McIntyre does not 
apply where the company’s contacts with the state amount to a “regular course of 
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Justice O’Connor’s “stream of commerce plus” standard as 
stated in Asahi requires that the defendant place its products 
into the stream of commerce and also engage in some 
additional state-directed activity, as referenced in the previous 
paragraph.344  McIntyre did not resolve whether Justice 
Brennan’s mere stream of commerce test survives when the 
defendant has not targeted a state directly but nonetheless 
makes more than de miminis in-state sales.  Justice Breyer 
suggested that it did when he expressed general commitment 
to the Court’s precedents and even cited Justice Brennan’s 
Asahi decision favorably,345 and some subsequent lower court 
decisions have concluded as much.346  But this issue is largely 
academic when evaluating a state tax.  When a state seeks to 
apply a sales tax, there is currently a physical presence 
jurisdiction requirement that dictates that a vendor do more 
than merely place its goods into the stream of commerce to 
 
dealing” rather than the consummation of “a single sale.”)  One of the Court’s 
precedents retained by McIntyre, see supra notes 318–19 and 323 and 
accompanying text, was Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, which stated that where a 
commercial actor is engaged in “continuous and widespread solicitation of 
business within a state” it is subject to jurisdiction there.  504 U.S. 298, 308 
(1992).  See supra notes 231–35 (discussing the due process analysis in Quill).  In 
her dissent in McIntyre, Justice Ginsburg commented on the distinct character of 
the product at issue—a $24,000 shearing machine used to process recyclable 
materials.  She stated: “[McIntyre’s] machine . . . is unlikely to sell in bulk 
worldwide, much less in any given State.  By dollar value, the price of a single 
machine represents a significant sale.  Had a manufacturer sold in New Jersey 
$24,000 worth of flannel shirts, cigarette lighters, or wire-rope splices, the Court 
would presumably find the defendant amenable to suit in that State.”  131 S. Ct. 
at 2803 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 344. See supra notes 339-340 and accompanying text.  See also Pollack, supra 
note 318, at 1098 (noting that Justice O’Connor’s standard has been referred to 
in shorthand as a “stream of commerce plus” or “foreseeability plus” standard). 
 345. 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. 102, 
117 (Brennan, J.)).  See also supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra notes 318, 323 and accompanying text.  Pollack, supra note 318, 
at 1105 (“Most courts have declined to view the rejection of jurisdiction in 
Nicastro as an endorsement of Justice O’Connor’s narrower ‘stream of commerce 
plus’ minimum contacts test, since in a splintered decision the holding is 
represented only by the narrowest agreement among opinions supporting the 
outcome, and Justice Breyer’s concurrence did not favor any particular test for 
determining minimum contacts”); Oscar G. Chase & Lori Brooke Day, Re-
examining New York’s Law of Personal Jurisdiction after Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 76 
ALBANY L. REV. 1009, 1050–51 (2012) (“Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion 
leaves open the possibility of exercising jurisdiction if a large and consistent 
enough flow of a defendant’s product enters [the state] through the stream of 
commerce [even if] the defendant has targeted [only] the United States market”) 
(square brackets added). 
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create jurisdiction.347  Also, the states’ corporate income taxes 
usually require that a taxpayer must have significant in-state 
sales or other activity to be subject to tax, and when this 
standard is met it is fair to presume that a company has 
sufficiently targeted the state.348 
b. Conceptual Problems with Applying McIntyre to 
State Taxation 
More fundamentally, subsequent to McIntyre, it remains 
the case that considerations of fairness are an essential part of 
the due process jurisdiction test.  Both the McIntyre 
concurrence and the dissent—five of the nine Justices – 
specifically concluded as much, and Justice Kennedy’s 
plurality decision is not inconsistent with this point.349  
Fairness considerations apply differently in the context of state 
taxation than they do for purposes of adjudicative jurisdiction. 
The Court’s recent adjudicative jurisdiction cases, 
including McIntyre, have paid homage to the Court’s 1945 
decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,350 and each 
of the opinions in McIntyre embraced International Shoe as the 
controlling precedent.351  International Shoe reevaluated the 
Court’s prior adjudicative jurisdiction rules to permit a state to 
collect tax from a multistate business seemingly because the 
Court was concerned with a tax avoidance strategy that was 
apparent on the facts.352  The Court has decided subsequent 
due process cases where it has similarly expressed concern 
with taxpayer attempts to rely upon the Court’s constitutional 
precedent for tax planning purposes,353 and those cases—as 
well as all of the Court’s prior due process precedents—were 
specifically retained by McIntyre.354  Justice Breyer’s opinion is 
understood to be the precedential opinion that resulted from 
 
 347. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 317–18. 
 348. See Hecht, supra note 212, at 14 (noting the tendency on the part of courts 
to use the amount of sales in a state “as a proxy for evidence of purposefulness of 
a seller’s activities with respect to that market.”).  See supra notes 109–10 and 
accompanying text. 
 349. See Chase and Day, supra note 346, at n.183.  See supra notes 294–95 and 
accompanying text (evaluating Justice Kennedy’s view of the due process fairness 
inquiry). 
 350. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 351. See supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra notes 179–86 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 354. See Noyes, supra note 175, at 60. 
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McIntrye and Justice Breyer has previously stated, by way of 
analogy, that “[i]f International Shoe stands for anything, it is 
that a truly interstate business may not shield itself from suit 
by a careful but formalistic structuring of its business 
dealings.”355 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality decision argued that 
sovereignty, not fairness, is the touchstone of the jurisdictional 
analysis,356 but his view was not the majority view, and there 
is reason to think that even his view would be qualified if 
applied to an attempt to collect state tax.  Justice Kennedy’s 
sovereignty analysis has been criticized for being 
ambiguous.357  However, it is at least clear that his implicit 
concern relates to the legal doctrines of choice of law and full 
faith and credit.358  In essence, the concern is that if an 
inappropriate forum becomes the chosen state of adjudication, 
the final decision rendered by that court—applying that state’s 
law, as a matter of full faith and credit—operates to the 
detriment of the appropriate state of adjudication.359  Also, 
 
 355. See Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26, 30 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (quoting Vencedor Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Gaugler Industries, 557 
F.2d 886, 891 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (concluding the fact that 
title to the allegedly defective products sold passed outside the jurisdiction in 
question was immaterial to the due process question). 
 356. 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J). 
 357. See, e.g., Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with it? 
Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 
740 (2012); Steinman, supra note 318, at 496–98. 
 358. See 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J.) (“Jurisdiction is power to declare the 
law”) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).  
See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980) 
(“[T]he Framers also intended that the States retain many essential attributes of 
sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their 
courts.  The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the 
sovereignty of all of its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both the 
original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Brilmayer 
and Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal Jurisdiction: Issues Left Open by 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. 
L. Rev. 617, 624 (stating that McIntyre is “but the latest case to adopt some of 
[the] line of thinking . . . that a state could use the operation of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause to efface the borders of its sister states and threaten their 
authority.”). 
 359. See Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 IOWA 
L. REV. 1163 (2013) (“concerns about the sovereign interests of other jurisdictions 
and the expectations of parties who rely on particular rules of law dominate the 
discussion in a closely related doctrinal area: choice of law . . . [n]ot surprisingly, 
choice of law is the “elephant in the room” in most personal-jurisdiction cases”); 
Hayward D. Reynolds, The Concept of Jurisdiction: Conflicting Legal Ideologies 
and Persistent Formalist Subversion, 18 Hastings Const. L.Q. 819, 830 (1991) 
(noting the “inextricable relationship between choice of law and jurisdictional 
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such a decision, because rendered by the wrong jurisdiction, is 
potentially unfair to the defendant.360 
Justice Kennedy’s sovereignty concerns have no analog 
where a state seeks to tax the sales of a multistate business 
made to persons in the state or the income of such a business 
as fairly apportioned to the state.361  There is no choice of law 
or full faith and credit concern in these cases.  Also, state 
sovereignty has an additional, countervailing meaning when 
evaluating state taxation that is not represented in the 
adjudicative jurisdiction analysis.  The U.S. Constitution 
confers upon the states a sovereign right to impose taxes,362 
and the Court has recognized that under the Constitution 
multistate businesses doing business in a state may be made 
to pay their fair share of state tax.363 These points in sum 
suggest that when evaluating state taxation Justice Kennedy’s 
state-versus-state sovereignty concerns should simply not 
apply. 
Justice Kennedy’s McIntyre decision – focused as it was on 
a foreign defendant—also broached possible concerns with 
respect to a second kind of sovereignty, state-versus-federal 
judicial sovereignty.364  His general notion was that certain 
claims might be subject to federal judicial jurisdiction rather 
than state judicial jurisdiction.365  But these concerns are also 
 
issues”); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law 
of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 753 (1987) (“Choice of law and 
choice of jurisdiction are not significantly different issues.  Both seek to determine 
whether the forum can act as sovereign in one respect or another.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 360. See supra notes 279-80 and 359 and accompanying text. 
 361. See Hecht, supra note 212, at 9 (stating that the choice of law concerns 
that have influenced the Supreme Court’s thinking about adjudicative 
jurisdiction are “irrelevant to [state] tax enforcement jurisdiction”). 
 362. See Fatale supra note 7, at 42.  See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 
750–51 (1999) (recognizing the importance of the states’ fisc as furthering their 
“ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens”) (Kennedy J.) 
(opinion joined by Justices Thomas and Scalia). 
 363. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  Justice Kennedy recently 
referenced this specific point in his concurrence in DMA Marketing Assn. v. 
Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  In that opinion, 
Justice Kennedy criticized the physical presence sales tax nexus rule stated in 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), as “now inflicting extreme harm 
and unfairness on the States”. . . resulting in the weakening of the “States’ 
education systems, healthcare services, and infrastructure.”  Id. For a discussion 
of Quill, see supra notes 85–98 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra note 281–82 and accompanying text. 
 365. See 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J.) (stating also [“o]urs is a legal system 
unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government, each 
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irrelevant when evaluating state taxation because there is no 
functional overlap between state and federal taxation since the 
state and federal governments each impose distinct taxes.366 
There is, of course, no certainty that Justice Kennedy’s 
sovereignty rationale will ever be supported by a majority of 
the Supreme Court’s Justices.  However, should this rationale 
one day be supported by the Court more generally, it would 
have to be re-stated with respect to the considerations that are 
unique to state taxation.  There would be no inconsistency in 
drawing such a distinction between adjudicative and state tax 
jurisdiction.  Although the Court has stated that the 
jurisdiction rules that apply to state taxation are “comparable” 
to those that apply for purposes of adjudicative jurisdiction367 
that articulation allows for differences, and three of the four 
Justices that signed the plurality decision in McIntyre have 
specifically expressed their understanding that there can be 
differences between the two jurisdictional standards.368 
III. CURRENT AREAS OF CONTROVERSY 
Several recent state corporate income and sales tax cases 
have evaluated due process jurisdiction questions.369  The Due 
Process Clause has also been recently considered in federal 
cases and commentary pertaining to Congressional legislation 
that has either been enacted or proposed with respect to state 
tax jurisdiction.370  This section considers these recent 
developments. 
A. Recent State Corporate Income Taxes Cases 
In the aftermath of Quill Corp. v North Dakota,371 there 
was a series of state corporate income tax cases that evaluated 
 
with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and 
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.”) (quotes omitted). 
 366. Fatale, supra note 7, at 48. 
 367. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308. 
 368. Id. at 319–20 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J. and Thomas, J., concurring) 
(agreeing with the majority opinion that “comparable” reasoning applies when 
evaluating state tax jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause as compared with 
the analysis applied for purposes of adjudicative jurisdiction, but noting that “I 
do not understand this to mean that the due process standards for adjudicative 
jurisdiction and those for legislative (or prescriptive) jurisdiction are necessarily 
identical”). 
 369. See infra notes 371–419 and accompanying text. 
 370. See infra notes 420–43 and accompanying text 
 371. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
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fact patterns in which a company engaged in tax planning 
sought to avoid nexus on the part of one or more of its corporate 
affiliates by arguing that those affiliates lacked “physical 
presence” Commerce Clause nexus with the state.372  These 
fact patterns resulted in a series of state tax cases in which the 
court concluded that the Quill physical presence standard did 
not apply outside the context of state sales tax.373 
In particular, many of the corporate income tax nexus 
cases decided by the states after Quill were cases where the 
general facts were that an in-state retailer separately 
incorporated an out-of-state affiliate as an “intangible holding 
company” (IHC).374  In these cases the retailer transferred its 
valuable trademarks to the IHC, then licensed back the right 
to use the trademarks for a royalty payment paid in connection 
with the in-state sale of trademarked products – a payment 
that the retailer then deducted for state income tax 
purposes.375  The arrangement was intended to shift the in-
state retailer’s otherwise taxable income outside the state’s 
taxing jurisdiction.376 
To address the IHC tax planning, some states sought to 
apply income tax to the royalty paid by the retailer by asserting 
tax jurisdiction over the IHC based upon the retailer’s in-state 
use of the trademarks.377  The state courts generally upheld 
these nexus assertions on the theory that in the absence of a 
physical presence standard the question under the Commerce 
Clause is whether the taxpayer is engaged in sufficient in-state 
market exploitation.378 
In the various IHC cases that post-date Quill, the issue 
was almost always the application of the Commerce Clause, 
because taxpayers were focused on extending the Quill 
physical presence standard to the states’ corporate income 
 
 372. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  See also Comptroller of 
Treasury v. Syl, Inc., 825 A.2d 399 (Md. 2003) (similar). 
 373. See the affiliate licensing cases cited supra note 106 and accompanying 
text. 
 374. See the affiliate licensing cases cited supra note 106 and accompanying 
text. 
 375. For a description of this structure as a tax planning arrangement, see 
Sheldon H. Laskin, Only a Name? Trademark Royalties, Nexus, and Taxing that 
which Enriches, 22 AKRON TAX J. 1, 4–8 (2007). 
 376. See id. 
 377. See generally the affiliate licensing cases cited supra note 106. 
 378. See generally the affiliate licensing cases cited supra note 106. 
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taxes.379  The repeated losses by taxpayers in these cases 
resulted in revised tax planning and a shift in focus from the 
Commerce Clause to the Due Process Clause.380  Two recent 
state Supreme Court cases in which the taxpayer prevailed, 
Scioto Ins. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n381 and Griffith v. 
ConAgra Brands, Inc.,382 illustrate this trend.383 
In Scioto, the tax planning pertained to an IHC 
established by the fast food company, Wendy’s.384  The tax 
planning was structured such that the IHC did not directly 
license the trademarks to an affiliate doing business in the 
state, but rather licensed the trademarks to an intermediate 
affiliate, which then licensed the trademarks to another 
affiliate doing business in the state.385  The trademarks and 
similar intangible property transferred to the IHC were used 
at Wendy’s restaurants.386  The parent corporation, Wendy’s 
International, had previously licensed this intangible property 
directly to the in-state restaurants,387 but then the parent 
transferred the trademarks to a subsidiary IHC, licensed the 
marks from the IHC, and sublicensed the marks to the 
restaurants.388  The issue was whether jurisdiction could be 
 
 379. The due process analysis in these cases was secondary, see generally the 
affiliate licensing cases cited at note 106, and in three of the cases, A&F 
Trademark, 605 S.E.2d 187, Lanco, 908 A.2d 176, and Geoffrey, 452 Mass. 17, 23 
n.9 (2009), no due process argument was even made. 
 380. See, e.g., Benton, et al., supra note 11 (“The reemergence of the due 
process clause in McIntyre . . . has come at a crucial time for state taxpayers, who 
have been watching for years as states have chipped away at the constitutional 
contours set forth in Quill and other U.S. Supreme Court decisions.”). 
 381. 279 P.3d 782 (Okla. 2012). 
 382. 728 S.E.2d 74 (W.Va. 2012). 
 383. A recent federal bankruptcy case also applied the Due Process Clause 
along with the Commerce Clause to prevent the imposition of state tax on a 
parent company that wholly owned several in-state REITs.  See In re Washington 
Mutual, Inc., 485 B.R. 510 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).  But see Bridges v. Autozone 
Properties, Inc., 900 S,2d 784, 800-809 (La. 2009) (finding that a parent 
corporation was subject to tax under the Due Process Clause based on the in-state 
activity of a wholly-owned REIT).  State tax planning with respect to REITs has 
also been common in recent years.  See, e.g., BankBoston Corp. v. Comm’r of 
Revenue, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 156 (2007); Charles F. Barnwell, “Is State Tax 
Planning Still Viable? REITs and RICs,” ST. TAX TODAY, Nov. 22, 2010. 
 384. See 279 P.3d at 783. 
 385. See 279 P.3d at 783, 784–85 (Gurich, J., and Taylor, C.J., dissenting). 
 386. Id. Some of the in-state restaurants were affiliate-owned and some were 
franchisee-owned.  Id. at 785 (Gurich, J., and Taylor, C.J., dissenting). 
 387. Such direct licensing activity would have established nexus under 
Oklahoma law.  See Geoffrey, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 132 P.3d 632, 638 
(Okla. Ct. App. 2005). 
 388. 279 P.3d at 783, 784–85 (Gurich, J., and Taylor, C.J., dissenting). 
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asserted over the IHC, despite the fact that the IHC arguably 
had no contractual privity with the state.389  The exact amount 
of royalties was not stated, but the tax assessment was nearly 
$500,000.390  The dissent noted the fact that the corporate 
structure was motivated by tax purposes.391  Similar tax 
planning involving indirect or “embedded” royalties has been 
common on the part of other taxpayers and in other states.392 
In ConAgra, the IHC licensed the trademarks to affiliates 
and other entities outside the state and received significant 
royalties from the efforts of those entities marketing the 
company’s trademarked products inside the state.393  There 
was a joint stipulation of facts that the court concluded was 
“favorable to the taxpayer”394 that the court repeated or made 
reference to four times, including in its holding.395  This 
stipulation included the fact that “all products bearing the 
trademarks and trade names were manufactured solely by 
unrelated or affiliated licensees of the foreign licensor outside 
of West Virginia.”396  Twice the court singled out what it 
seemed to consider the most important stipulated fact – that 
the IHC “did not direct or dictate how the licensees distributed 
the products bearing the trademarks and trade names.”397  
 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. at 785 (Gurich, J., and Taylor, C.J., dissenting). 
 391. Id. at 788 (“The motivation behind this corporate anatomy was to shelter 
[from state tax] royalties generated from use of Wendy’s trademarks and the 
company’s proprietary information throughout the United States.”). 
 392. See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue, 83 
Mass. App. Ct. 65, 81 (2013).  See also Lynnley Browning, Critics Call Delaware 
a Tax Haven, NEW YORK TIMES, May 29, 2009,  http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/05/30/business/30delaware.html?_r=0 (noting the comments of Michael 
Mazerov that “embedded royalty” companies are a new way to exploit the state 
tax IHC “loophole”). 
 393. See 728 S.E.2d at 76 (“Through the execution of licensing agreements, 
[the IHC] began collecting royalty payments for the use of its trademarks and 
trade names by various unrelated, third party licensees and [company] affiliated 
licensees.  The trademarks and trade names, to name but a few, included familiar 
brands, such as Armour, Butterball, Country Skillet, Healthy Choice, Kid 
Cuisine, Morton, Swift and Swift Premium.  The royalties were collected by [the 
IHC] from the sale by the licensees of food products bearing the trademarks and 
trade names to clients and customers throughout the United States, including 
West Virginia”) (emphasis added); id. at 77 (noting that during the 3-year audit 
period the in-state licenses generated between $19,269,000 and $46,247,000 in 
sales, resulting in royalties for the IHC of approximately $1,156,000). 
 394. Id. at 82 
 395. See id. at 76, 82, 84. 
 396. Id. at 84. 
 397. See id. at 76, 82. 
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Assuming that the IHC—or the company more generally—did 
in fact engage in this activity, as would seem likely as a 
practical matter, the case may mostly suggest a failure of proof 
on the part of the state.398 
In both Scioto and ConAgra, the taxpayer prevailed in 
whole or in part on due process grounds.399  But the analysis in 
each case is obviously incorrect because due process 
jurisdiction cannot be defeated merely by re-structuring a 
company’s in-state market penetration such that this targeting 
is indirect—certainly not when the company generates 
significant in-state sales.400  Each fact pattern suggests that it 
 
 398. A similar failure of proof may have undermined the plaintiff’s case in the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision, McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).  See supra note 
302 and accompanying text.  See also infra note 400 (discussing further the 
ConAgra facts during the relevant tax years). 
 399. See Scioto, 279 P.3d at 784; ConAgra, 728 S.E.2d at 84.  Neither decision 
relied upon McIntyre, although ConAgra purported to rely on Justice Brennan’s 
decision in Asahi, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  See ConAgra, 728 S.E.2d at 82–83 (citing 
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring)).  ConAgra also concluded, with 
reference to its due process analysis, that there was no state tax jurisdiction 
under the Commerce Clause.  See id. at 84. 
 400. See supra notes 339–48 and accompanying text.  See also Truck Renting 
and Leasing Assn. v. Comm’r, 433 Mass. 733, 738–40 (2001) (finding due process 
corporate income tax nexus with respect to an out-of-state trucking company 
whose trucks were brought into the state by unrelated lessees because the 
company’s income was derived from in-state property, i.e. the trucks, and the 
company both knew and intended that its trucks would be driven in the state by 
such lessees); Missouri Gas Energy v. Kansas Division of Property Valuation, 313 
P.3d 789, 799–800 (Kan. 2013), cert. denied, 2014 WL 1364664 (2014) (finding 
due process nexus for purposes of an ad valoreum property tax with respect to 
out-of-state entities engaged in the delivery of natural gas where: (1) the entities’ 
gas was consigned to unrelated pipelines and stored in the state on an interim 
basis to be subsequently delivered in another state and (2) the decision to store 
the gas in the state was made by the unrelated pipelines). 
    The dissent in Scioto would have found jurisdiction under both the Due Process 
Clause and Commerce Clause because the taxpayer “intentionally placed its 
property into the stream of Oklahoma commerce, realizing the benefits and 
protections afforded by the people and laws of this state.”  See Scioto, 279 P.3d at 
788 (Gurich, J., and Taylor, J., dissenting).  In ConAgra, public records reveal 
similar in-state market exploitation directed at the various states, including, 
presumably, West Virginia.  See ConAgra Form 10—K/A, filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Comission, Apr. 29, 2005,  http://www.epa.gov/ region1//superfund 
/sites/wellsgh/547715.pdf, at 37 (noting that during two of the years at issue in 
ConAgra, 2002-2003, the company incurred “various types of marketing costs in 
order to promote its products, including retailer incentives and consumer 
incentives”); id. at 27 (noting that ConAgra’s retailer incentives during this 
period were retailer-specific and its consumer incentives included consumer 
coupons).  See ConAgra Brands, Inc. v. Comptroller, 2015 Md. Tax LEXIS 2, 3–
12 (Md. Tax Ct. 2015) (finding Due Process and Commerce Clause nexus as to the 
IHC in ConAgra, “Brands,” on similar facts for a subset of the same tax years). 
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was the result of tax planning that was intended to bring about 
the court’s result.401  However, the Supreme Court’s precedent 
beginning with International Shoe Co. v. Washington402—
which ushered in the Court’s modern due process analysis403—
makes clear that the Court does not sanction the use of due 
process fairness principles as a methodology for state tax 
planning.404 
In contrast to Scioto and ConAgra, in Gore Enterprise 
Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller,405 Maryland’s highest court 
rejected a taxpayer argument that the state lacked due process 
jurisdiction as to a corporation that held patents for, and 
provided  financing services to, an in-state related retailer 
corporation.406  Gore concluded that nexus was appropriate 
with respect to the out-of-state corporation because it was 
engaged in integrated business activity with the in-state retail 
corporation and had no “separate economic substance” apart 
from that in-state corporation.407  Such fact determinations are 
frequently possible when an affiliated enterprise divides itself 
into separate corporations for tax purposes and would seem 
clearly to be appropriate under due process principles 
evaluating fairness and notice.408 
 
 401. As to Scioto, see supra notes 391–92 and accompanying text.  ConAgra 
does not reference tax planning, but the corporation owning the trademarks 
resembles those in cases where the tax planning was exposed.  See generally the 
affiliate licensing cases cited supra note 106.  See also ConAgra Brands, Inc. v. 
Comptroller, 2015 Md. Tax LEXIS at 8 (case evaluating similar facts during the 
same tax years concludes “Brands was organized in part to obtain a reduction in 
taxes”). 
 402. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 403. See supra notes 168–78 and accompanying text. 
 404. See supra notes 350–55 and accompanying text. 
 405. 87 A.3d 1263 (Md. 2014). 
 406. Id. at 1271–80.  The court rejected the taxpayer’s related Commerce 
Clause claim as well. 
 407. 87 A.3d at 1276–78, 1280. 
 408. Similarly, recent state tax cases have found for sales tax purposes that an 
out-of-state Internet vendor is subject to tax in the state based upon the activities 
of an affiliated corporation that owns and operates in-state retail stores.  See 
supra note 144 and accompanying text.  See also John A. Swain, Cybertaxation 
and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation or Affiliate Nexus? 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
419, 441–45, 465–67 (2002) (arguing that when an in-state corporation is engaged 
in a unitary business with an out-of-state corporation that relationship, without 
more, should confer nexus as to the out-of-state corporation for corporate income 
tax purposes); Handel, supra note 212, at 663 (similar).  A similar analysis to that 
advocated by Professors Swain and Handel was used to justify the lower court 
decision in Gore.  Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller, 60 A.3d 107, 115–17 
(2013), aff’d 87 A.3d 1263 (Md. 2014).  When the Maryland Court of Appeals 
affirmed that lower court decision in Gore, it stressed that it was re-focusing the 
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Scioto, ConAgra, and Gore each suggest that state law 
considerations can significantly impact the constitutional 
nexus analysis.  In Scioto, the court suggested that the state 
could have addressed the tax inequity apparent on the facts 
some other way—seemingly  the court’s preference.409  In 
ConAgra, the court was unwilling to extend to the facts an 
“economic presence” doctrine for evaluating constitutional 
nexus that it had articulated in a prior case.410  In Gore, the 
court made clear that it was applying a judicial doctrine that 
it had previously applied in state tax cases.411 
State law furnishes an important component of the tax 
nexus analysis, as state efforts to assert jurisdiction cannot 
advance to a constitutional test if they are not authorized 
under state law.412  But it is neither appropriate nor wise to 
 
decision on the conclusion that the entities in question had no “separate economic 
substance,” rather than on the conclusion that the entities were engaged in a 
unitary business.  87 A.3d at 1276–78.  However, the Court’s analysis nonetheless 
resembled unitary analysis.  See Mary C. Alexander and Jeffrey A. Friedman, 
Maryland’s Gore-y Nexus Standard: Out-of-State Holding Companies Subject to 
Tax, ST. TAX TODAY, April 14, 2014.  See also Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Franchise 
Tax Board, 237 Cal. App. 4th 193, 214-219 (2015)  (finding nexus on behalf of out-
of-state corporations that bundled and securitized loans and serviced such loans 
on behalf of in-state affiliates in part because the out-of-state corporations’ 
business activities were interdependent with the business activities of its in-state 
affiliates). Harley Davidson rejected the taxpayer’s claim that there no due 
process jurisdiction because the out-of-state corporations did not “target” the 
state.  See id. at 217-218. 
 409. The court’s decision is brief—less than 2 pages, see 279 P. 3d at 783–84—
but its discussion on this point is detailed: 
    The proper point at which Oklahoma can assess taxes on the amount that 
Wendy’s International pays to Scioto is when those funds are in the hands of 
Wendy’s International.  If the Tax Commission believes the amount paid by 
Wendy’s International to Scioto should be taxed, then the Tax Commission 
should ask the Legislature to eliminate the deduction for payments made 
under licensing arrangements like the one in this case.  While the Tax 
Commission is properly concerned with the taxation of business activity in 
Oklahoma, the Tax Commission cannot unilaterally close deduction lacunae 
or gaps in the revenue law with which the Commission disagrees.  The proper 
remedy for OTC is not to have the courts expand the . . . Tax Code’s scope. . . 
but rather to press for the gap’s closure by the Legislature. 
    Id. at 784 (quotes omitted).  The court also took three sentences to note that 
the in-state activity of the restaurant chain, Wendy’s, brought about the payment 
of other state taxes, as if that point was somehow legally relevant.  See id. at 783. 
  410. 728 S.E.2d at 81–82 (referencing Tax Comm’r v. MBNA Am. Bank, 640 
S.E.2d 226 (W.V. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1141 (2007)). 
 411. 87 A. 3d at 1275–83 (citing prior Maryland cases). 
 412. In the midst of the various state cases that concluded that the states could 
assert tax jurisdiction against an IHC licensing trademarks into the state, see 
supra note 106, the Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that the assertion of 
this jurisdiction was impermissible under that state’s tax nexus statute.  Acme 
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render a decision on state law as a matter of constitutional 
jurisprudence.  The decisions in Scioto and ConAgra both 
analogized to adjudicative jurisdiction principles to determine 
that an out-of-state IHC established as one corporation within 
a multiple-corporate affiliated enterprise engaged in selling in-
state food products was not subject to that state’s taxing 
jurisdiction.413  The inference is that in a hypothetical 
situation, where an in-state resident is poisoned by a food 
product of one of these companies, that the resident would be 
foreclosed from bringing suit in his or her home state—the 
state in which both the food product was purchased and eaten, 
as well as the site of the tragedy—against the IHC, the 
corporation within the group holding the corporate profits.  
That result seems neither appropriate nor likely. 
B. Recent State Cases and Federal Law Developments 
with respect to State Sales Tax 
With respect to sales tax, the application of the physical 
presence safe harbor as stated by Quill Corp v. North Dakota414 
means that a state seeking to impose tax jurisdiction upon a 
remote vendor—including a remote Internet vendor—is 
necessarily focused on whether the vendor has some in-state 
contact that falls outside such safe harbor.415  Some of the 
recent state cases finding sales tax jurisdiction have pertained 
to a remote vendor that was affiliated with a corporation that 
owned in-state stores engaged in selling similar products.416  
Other recent cases finding sales tax jurisdiction have been ones 
where the remote vendor used related or unrelated parties to 
solicit sales or to otherwise facilitate the in-state sale of its 
products or services.417  Remote vendors are typically 
corporations and the application of the Quill physical presence 
rule can be unclear when applied to a corporation—a legal 
 
Royalty Co. v. Director of Revenue, 96 S.W.3d 72 (Mo. 2002).  The logic employed 
by Acme was questionable—it was a 4-3 decision in which the dissent claimed 
that the majority’s decision “defie[d] economic reality.”  Id. at 76.  However, when 
evaluating its state’s tax jurisdiction statute a state supreme court is at least 
focused on a straightforward question that it is uniquely situated to consider. 
 413. See ConAgra, 728 S.E.2d at 82–83; Scioto, 279 P.3d at 784. 
 414. 504 U.S. 299 (1992). 
 415. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
 416. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.  See also Hecht, supra note 
212, at 9; Plattner, supra note 142, at 193–94. 
 417. See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text.  See also Hecht, supra 
note 212, at 9; Plattner, supra note 142, at 193–94. 
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construct that lacks inherent physical attributes—if the 
corporation’s activities do not closely resemble those protected 
by the Court in Quill.418  Therefore, the states generally apply 
a due process-like inquiry to determine whether a vendor’s in-
state contacts permit a determination that the vendor has 
reasonably relied upon Quill.419 
Recent federal law developments with respect to state 
taxes have included Congressional bills enacted or proposed 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause to override the Quill 
physical presence standard.420  For example, in 2009 Congress 
passed the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act,421 
which dispenses with the physical presence nexus requirement 
that would otherwise apply, and requires e-sellers of cigarettes 
as a matter of federal law to comply with the states’ cigarette 
excise collection requirements.422  The PACT Act imposes 
federal penalties for failure to comply with the Act.423  Congress 
has also since the time of Quill considered broader legislation 
that would preempt the application of Quill more generally as 
to all types of taxable sales in the instance of large-sized 
vendors.424  Recently, such a bill, the Marketplace Fairness Act 
(MFA), passed the Senate,425 although its prospects in the 
House remain uncertain.426 
The PACT Act applies even where an Internet seller has 
sold only a single pack of cigarettes into a state.427  In part 
because of this low threshold several vendors that were to 
become subject to the Act brought suit in federal court prior to 
the Act’s effective date to enjoin its enforcement, on the theory 
that the law would apply even in cases in which its application 
 
 418. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 419. See generally supra notes 121–47 and accompanying text. 
 420. See The Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (“PACT”) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 375 
et seq.; The Marketplace Fairness Act (“MFA”), S. 336/S. 743/H.R. 684 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
 421. 15 U.S.C. § 375 et seq. 
 422. 15 U.S.C. §§ 375–76(a). 
 423. 15 U.S.C. §§ 377–78. 
 424. See Swain, Cybertaxation, supra note 408 n.22. 
 425. See Harry J. Reske, U.S Senate Approves Marketplace Fairness Act, 
STATE TAX TODAY, May 6, 2013 (noting the U.S. Senate’s passage of the S.743 by 
a 69-27 vote “[a]fter more than a decade of deliberation”). 
 426. See Jennifer DePaul, House & Senate Republicans Echo Boehner’s Pledge 
to Kill MFA, STATE TAX TODAY, Nov. 19, 2014. 
 427. See Red Earth LLC v. US, 657 F.3d 138, 145 (2012); Gordon v. Holder, 
721 F.3d 638, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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would violate the Due Process Clause.428  A preliminary 
injunction was issued with respect to the state tax provisions 
set forth in the Act in two of the three cases, but was denied in 
the third.429 
The preliminary injunctions issued in the recent PACT Act 
cases were largely justified in reliance upon Justice Breyer’s 
statement in McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,430 that no 
prior Supreme Court decision had concluded that a single in-
state sale would confer adjudicative jurisdiction.431  The 2nd 
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals upheld a preliminary injunction 
on this basis, but recognized that the Supreme Court’s prior 
cases did not necessarily suggest that a single in-state sale 
could never result in due process jurisdiction.432  The court 
stated that “the underlying constitutional question is close,” 
and that in such cases a court “should uphold the injunction 
and remand for trial on the merits.”433  The D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals similarly upheld a preliminary injunction in 
reliance upon Justice Breyer’s statement in McIntyre 
suggesting that a single in-state sale might not confer due 
 
 428. Id.  See also Musser’s Inc. v. United States, 1 F. Supp 3d. 308, 310 (E.D. 
Pa. 2014). 
 429. The preliminary injunctions were issued in Red Earth, see 657 F.3d at 
145, and Gordon, see 721 F.3d at 645.  The preliminary injunction was denied in 
Musser’s.  See 1 F. Supp at 310.  In Musser’s, the court subsequently denied a 
motion for consideration and then, in a subsequent action, dismissed the 
plaintiff’s complaint.  Id.  Although the issue is not discussed in any of the three 
cases, the cases were apparently each brought as “facial” constitutional 
challenges to the PACT Act, as opposed to “as applied” constitutional challenges, 
and therefore the two preliminary injunctions were issued on this basis.  See 
generally Red Earth, 657 F.3d at 142–43, 148 (discussing the issuing of the 
injunction); Gordon, 721 F.3d at 641 (same); Musser’s, 1 F. Supp at 310 
(discussing the denial of the injunction).  Because the issue is not discussed in 
any of the cases, it is not clear how the claims could appropriately be brought as 
facial constitutional challenges since typically “a plaintiff can only succeed in a 
facial challenge by ‘establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which 
the Act would be valid’, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its 
applications.”  See Washington State Grange v Washington State Republican 
Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008), (quoting United States v Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
745 (1987)). 
 430. 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 431. Red Earth, 657 F.3d at 145 (citing McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, 
J., concurring); Gordon v. Holder, 721 F.3d 638, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing 
McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer’s statement 
may have been incorrect and in any event the Supreme Court’s precedents 
suggest that a single sale may confer adjudicative jurisdiction in some instances.  
See supra notes 303, 336 and accompanying text. 
 432. Red Earth, 657 F.3d at 145. 
 433. Id. 
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process jurisdiction.434  The D.C. Circuit Court concluded, 
however, similar to the court in the 2nd circuit, that Justice 
Breyer’s statement potentially allowed for a finding of 
jurisdiction, and so enjoined the case for further fact finding.435  
The D.C. Circuit Court stated that “[w]hile it may prove to be 
the case that, in the Internet age, a single sale establishes 
‘minimum contacts’ as a matter of law, this seems like precisely 
the sort of difficult constitutional question on which our 
analysis would benefit from factual development.”436 
The D.C Circuit Court’s decision was rendered by a 2-1 
vote.437  The dissenting judge concluded that the plaintiff’s 
“Due Process Clause claim is entirely without merit” because 
compliance with the PACT Act is required under federal and 
not state law.438  A similar conclusion informed the holding in 
a third, similar PACT Act case, where a Pennsylvania federal 
district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction, because 
“the [PACT] Act’s tax-payment requirement is not being 
imposed by a state, acting unilaterally, but by Congress, and 
the legislative due process analysis must reflect the federal 
character of the legislation.”439  The Pennsylvania district court 
decision stated that “[i]nterstate businesses are subject to the 
legislative jurisdiction of Congress, which is free to require 
compliance with state and local law.”440  It also stated that 
“[a]ll interstate businesses are subject to the legislative 
 
 434. Gordon, 721 F.3d at 652. (“The Supreme Court has never found ‘that a 
single isolated sale . . . is sufficient’ ”  to establish minimum contacts.”) (quoting 
Red Earth, 657 F.3d at 145). 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id.  The case was later dismissed with prejudice upon agreement by the 
parties. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188691 (W.D.N.Y. 2013).  The PACT Act is now 
fully enforceable in the 2nd Circuit.  See  http://www.justice.gov/usao-wdny/pr/
pact-act-now-fully-enforceable. 
 437. See Gordon, 721 F.3d 638. 
 438. Id. at 659 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  That dissenting judge observed 
that: 
When Congress enacts a federal law of this kind and renders violators of 
that law subject to federal criminal prosecution or federal civil suit, the 
law does not violate the minimum contacts principle of the Due Process 
Clause.  The reason is quite simple: In such federal-law cases, the 
relevant sovereign and jurisdiction is the United States, not one of the 
individual States. 
 439. Musser’s, 1 F. Supp. at 315. 
 440. Id. (the court also quoted International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315: “It is no 
longer debatable that Congress, in the exercise of the commerce power, may 
authorize the states, in specified ways, to regulate interstate commerce or impose 
burdens upon it”). 
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jurisdiction of Congress who is free to require compliance with 
state law as a condition of engaging in interstate commerce.”441 
The mixed success of the plaintiffs in the PACT Act cases 
has caused vendors anticipating the passage of the MFA to 
think that they may be able to prevent enforcement of the 
MFA—at least in select instances—on similar due process 
grounds.442  The MFA would require an Internet vendor that 
has total gross receipts from Internet sales exceeding 
$1,000,000 to begin collecting sales and use tax in the 
subsequent tax year with respect to any state that has met the 
sales and use tax simplification standards set forth in the 
Act.443  Some commentators have argued that even though the 
only vendors subject to the Act are those with $1,000,000 or 
more in total sales, those vendors may be able to challenge the 
application of the law in any state where the vendor’s sales are 
of lesser significance.444 
Congressional bills like the MFA that would address the 
jurisdictional limits that apply to the states’ sales and use tax 
collection duty to be imposed upon remote vendors have been 
 
 441. Id. 
 442. See James Bull Sterling, Survey of South Carolina Law: Tax Law: Remote 
Seller Sales and Use Tax Law: How Proposed Law will Impact South Carolina, 
65 S.C. L. REV. 851, 851 n.25 (“A remote seller could argue the Act violates its 
individual due process rights because even though the remote seller has 
aggregate sales over the $1 million mark, it only makes few sales into a particular 
state.”); Kenneth F. Warren, Regulators Throughout American History Have Been 
Reluctant to Regulate Cigars and the FDA Still is Today, But Why?, 8 Pitt. J. 
ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH L. 160, 187, 187 n.63 (2014) (noting the argument of 
Michael P. Abate that the MFA and the PACT Act may both ultimately fail legal 
challenges under the Due Process Clause) (citing Michael P. Abate, E-Commerce 
Taxation Bill Might be Unconstitutional, LAW 360 (Apr. 30, 2013)); Denning, 
supra note 11, at 841 (citing Red Earth as offering “a preview of the difficulties 
Congress may face” with respect to succeeding with the MFA).  See also State’s 
Attorneys General: Marketplace Fairness Act Would Violate Due Process Clause, 
STATE TAX TODAY, June 18, 2013 (referencing a letter written by 3 state attorney 
generals “on behalf of remote sales retailers in our states” stating, inter alia, “any 
state’s efforts to enforce the collection of use tax proceeds from remote sales 
retailers with little or no contact with the taxing authority will remain 
constitutionally suspect”).   
 443. See generally S. 336/S. 743/H.R. 684 113th Cong. (2013). 
 444. See supra note 442.  These would be “as applied” constitutional challenges 
that could potentially succeed with respect to individual vendors as to certain 
states, but even if successful, would not threaten the application of the MFA more 
generally.  See supra note 429 and accompanying test.  As the Supreme Court has 
recently stated, a facial challenge to a federal statute on constitutional grounds 
“must fail where the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep.”  See Washington 
State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449. 
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proposed dating back prior to Quill445, so it is difficult to be too 
optimistic that such a bill will one day become law.  However, 
if the law passes, there are at least two obvious problems with 
the argument that the MFA may be subject to challenge in 
certain states on due process grounds—both of which are 
suggested by the PACT Act analogy. 
As noted, two courts have issued preliminary injunctions 
in  PACT Act cases on due process grounds on the theory that 
the Act can apply to an Internet vendor that sells only a single 
pack of cigarettes into the state.446  Those injunctions were 
specifically justified in reliance on Justice Breyer’s statement 
in McIntyre that the Supreme Court has never found due 
process jurisdiction in a case in which the defendant has made 
only a single sale into the state.447  But the two PACT Act cases 
both acknowledged that the Court has not ruled out that there 
could be jurisdiction on such facts.448  Also, more 
fundamentally, unlike the PACT Act, the MFA cannot be 
imposed on a remote vendor that makes only a single small in-
state sale.449  To be subject to the MFA a remote vendor would 
have to make significant sales—and only then would it be able 
to  raise a potential due process issue as to specific states where 
its volume of sales is relatively small.450  The picture of a 
remote vendor that makes only one small in-state sale, on 
which facts the PACT Act could apply, is very different from 
that of a vendor that makes significant sales, with only a 
relatively small volume of sales in one or more states.  Due 
process fairness concerns are not so obviously implicated in the 
latter instance.451 
The general issue addressed in the PACT Act cases by the 
Pennsylvania District Court and the dissenting opinion in the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals also lurks in the MFA context.452  
Compliance with the MFA would be required under a federal 
law enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause.453  Congress is 
 
 445. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 318, 318 n.11 (noting Congressional bills that would 
have ‘overrule[d]’ the Bellas Hess rule.”) (quotes in the original). 
 446. See supra notes 427–29 and accompanying text. 
 447. See supra notes 430–31 and accompanying text. 
 448. See supra notes 432–36 and accompanying text. 
 449. See generally S. 336/S. 743/H.R. 684 113th Cong. (2013). 
 450. Id. 
 451. See supra notes 306–07 and 333–38 and accompanying text. 
 452. Musser’s, 1 F. Supp at 315; Gordon, 721 F.3d at 659 (Kavanaugh, 
dissenting). 
 453. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have the power “to regulate 
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permitted, in its discretion, to both protect and burden 
commerce under the Commerce Clause454—a point that Quill 
itself made when suggesting that Congress enact a bill like the 
MFA.455  Some commentators who have evaluated a 
prospective challenge to the MFA have argued that, 
notwithstanding the Commerce Clause, Congressional bills 
cannot override a business taxpayer’s due process rights.456  
But it is likely that because such rights are not “fundamental 
rights” or “liberty interests” Congress would not be so 
constrained.457  Also, in any event, it is questionable whether 
it really is unfair as a matter of due process for a company with 
significant U.S. sales to be made to comply with the sales tax 
laws in the various states in which the company make sales.458  
Certainly the enactment of a Congressional law would seem to 
give such large-size companies fair notice of their state sales 
and use tax responsibilities.459 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence has been in a state of evolution throughout the 
 
commerce . . . among the several states”). 
 454. See Ne. Bancorp. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys, 472 U.S. 159, 
174 (1985); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946). 
 455. 504 U.S. at 318 (citing Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 
408 (1946) for the proposition that “[n]o matter how we evaluate the burdens that 
use taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with 
our conclusions.”). 
 456. See generally the articles cited supra note 442. 
 457. See William Cohen, “Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional 
State Laws: Forgotten Solutions to an Old Enigma,” 35 STAN. L. REV. 385, 412–
14, 422 (1983) (arguing that Congress can validate state tax laws and thereby 
immunize those laws from a potential Constitutional challenge, including one 
initiated under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, in any instance 
where individual “liberty interests” are not impaired); Paul J. Hartman, 
Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-State Mail-Order Sales, 39 VAND. L. REV. 993, 
1023–24 (1986) (stating that “due process clause protection [may have] more 
elasticity in the context of fiscal matters in federalism than the clause does in a 
civil rights context” and that congressional judgments that might be said to 
impair due process in the state tax context are more likely to be permissible 
“because Congress would not be restricting due process in the context of 
fundamental constitutional rights or suspect classifications”). 
 458. See supra notes 306–07 and 333–38 and accompanying text. 
 459. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) involved a 
similar fact pattern since the state employer tax requirement at issue in that case 
had been specifically authorized by Congress, thereby dispensing with any 
Commerce Clause claim on the part of the petitioner-corporation.  See supra note 
186 and accompanying text. 
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Court’s history, but now focuses primarily on policing 
discriminatory state action, consistent with the Framers’ 
intent.460  As a result, subjective questions concerning the 
degree to which a state law burdens interstate commerce or 
whether an economic actor is sufficiently present in a state to 
be subject to state authority have been generally eliminated 
from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny in state tax cases.461 
Since the time of the 14th Amendment, the Court has 
generally considered whether the imposition of a state tax is 
consistent with due process and Commerce Clause 
principles.462  As the Court’s various Commerce Clause 
standards for testing state tax jurisdiction have diminished in 
importance, its due process standards have become more 
important.463 
Several recent Supreme Court cases have considered the 
Court’s due process standards as applied to determine 
adjudicative jurisdiction.464  Because the standard applied for 
purposes of adjudicative jurisdiction is comparable to that 
applied for state tax purposes, these recent Supreme Court 
cases are relevant to the state tax analysis.465  One of the 
Court’s recent cases, J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro,466 is of 
particular importance to the analysis because McIntyre is a 
specific jurisdiction case, similar to most state tax cases, and 
McIntyre pertained to jurisdiction asserted against a business 
entity doing business in multiple states.467  Also, McIntyre is a 
plurality decision that has rendered a somewhat ambiguous 
precedent, and that has created some concern that the Court 
has narrowed the circumstances in which adjudicative 
jurisdiction will lie.468  However, McIntyre should have no 
impact on the typical case pertaining to state tax jurisdiction 
applied to a multistate business because, among other things, 
 
 460. See generally supra Part I.B. 
 461. Id. 
 462. Id. 
 463. Id. 
 464. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  See also supra notes 161, 169–
72 and accompanying text. 
 465. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 466. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 467. See supra notes 16–17, 211–12 and accompanying text.  Compare Walden 
v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (specific jurisdiction case pertaining to an 
individual who brought suit in Nevada based on allegedly tortuous conduct that 
took place in another state).  See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 468. See generally supra Part II.E. 
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McIntyre is not implicated when a business targets a state’s 
market either directly or indirectly and that business’ in-state 
sales volume or market exploitation is significant.469 
Recent state tax cases and federal developments with 
respect to state taxation have raised different issues 
concerning the future application of due process principles in 
the context of state tax jurisdiction, some of which depend upon 
whether the state tax at issue is a corporate income tax or sale 
tax.470  In general, those issues will necessarily be resolved over 
the course of time.  However, despite some recent commentator 
statements claiming that the re-emergence of the Due Process 
Clause as an important principle probing state tax jurisdiction 
may result in significant restrictions placed upon the 
states471—and some taxpayer victories in state tax cases where 
the Due Process Clause has seemed to serve this purpose472—
state taxing agencies should take comfort in the larger trend.  
A due process jurisdictional standard emphasizing 
considerations of fairness and notice is a better standard for 
purposes of state tax administration than the historical 
alternative, which emphasized arbitrary and economically 
questionable limitations imposed under the Commerce Clause. 
 
 469. See supra notes 339–43 and accompanying text. 
 470. See generally supra Part III. 
 471. See supra note 11 and accompany text.  See also supra notes 341 and 442 
and accompanying text). 
 472. See generally supra Part III.A. 
